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*Dr. Forkosch is Professor of Law and Chairman of the Department of
Public Law at Brooklyn Law School, Brooklyn, New York. He has seven
books and numerous articles to his credit.
h oDUucT oN
The legality of our Vietnam (Southeast Asian)' adventure,
which technically is not a war within the meaning of article I,
section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution, or even of article II, sec-
tion 2, clause 1, is somewhat tied in with other problems such as
the power of the federal government to conscript, and a regis-
trant's right to counsel at any time within the Selective Service
System. The answers to the questions raised by these interre-
lated problems are of transcendent importance to the entire
country and particularly to registrants. Their resolution may
have international repercussions as well.
Questions about the constitutionality of the American presence
in force in Vietnam, combined with the ability and power of
the government to conscript in these times and under present
circumstances, have created increasing pressures within our
society and have spawned or increased numerous other problems,
such as dissension and violence in our educational systems,
inflation, and the plight of minorities. In a somewhat large
degree this Vietnam cancer has contributed to the moral and
political disillusionment of today's youth. Whether the Gordian
knot physically tying this country to those shores can be
judicially severed is a question that awaits examination in the
opening portion of this article.
The right of a registrant to counsel is of great practical im-
portance to millions of young men and might well be treated as
the fulcrum for the constitutional and conscription questions. A
1. This may illustrate a new kind of domino theory, with increasing Ameri-
can intervention elsewhere plus escalation. On March 11, 1970, Senator Ful-
bright introduced a resolution as the "sense of the Senate", challenging the
President's authority to commit American troops or aircraft to combat in
Laos, and requiring "affirmative action" by Congress before such a commit-
meat occurred. See also notes 88 and 105 infra.
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registrant may, in theory, have a lawyer represent him when-
ever a local board or other internal body permits it. In other
words, the presence of counsel is perhaps a matter of ad hoc
grace; or there may be national regulations or procedures
allowing special or general representation; or a statute or execu-
tive order may so grant it; or, lastly, there may be a consti-
tutional right to counsel, again either generally or particularly.
None of the first three alternatives ordinarily exists;" it is the
constitutional basis which is here explored.
To date, there has been a combined legislative, executive,
administrative, and judicial policy which apparently has ne-
gatived any right to counsel within the System itself.8 If the
Congress is unwilling or too lethargic to act, as well it may
act through its statutory power, then the President, who is
expostulating on the inequities of the System, can easily amend
the 1 egulations to accomplish this result by a stroke of his pen.
A constitutional right, nevertheless, cannot be rejected, nor
may a course of administrative or even judicial conduct, however
long or accepted, replace it. The right today can still be judi-
cially enforced by reversal of prior decisions, or by modifying or
distinguishing them.
To comprehend the general existence of this right within
the System entails a discussion of two items. First, the power
of the federal government to conscript will be examined. This
will involve: (1) An extended analysis of the background and
source of the power to conscript. (2) The national and historic
climate of opinion concerning its necessity but cast against the
individual's right to freedom. (3) The exceptional situation
which here permits one's liberty to be taken without minimum
procedural safeguards. (4) The particular and limited appli-
cation and effectuation of these powers, rights, and needs in the
2. Selective Service Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) 1957, "That no
registrant may be represented before the local board by anyone acting as attor-
ney or legal counsel." What of appeal or any other boards? And what of the
final appeal to the President? This Regulation uses the demonstrative "the"
and the modifying "local", i.e., both specifying and therefore particularizing.
See also note 137 infra.
3. There are several cases denying that this right exists; United States v.
Tantash, 409 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1969); Nickerson v. United States, 391 F.2d
760 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 907 (1968); United States v.
Stafford, 389 F2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968). See also United States v. Capson, 347
F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965), as well as
United States v. Sturgis, 342 F2d 328 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
879 (1965). However, in United States v. Weller, 90 S. Ct 1118 (1970), the
Court granted a conscientious objector review as to the constitutionality of the
regulation (see note 2 supra) forbidding representation.
[Vol. 22
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REGISTRANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
current situation. Second, the actual rights of the registrant
will be examined against the backdrop of the conscription
power. This will be accomplished by means of parallels to be
drawn from administrative law, techniques, and proceedings
which are here to be applied within the administrative system,
and likewise taking into account exceptions. Additionally, as a
third item, the question will be raised whether such a "basic"
or "essential" constitutional right to counsel, assuming it exists,
should or does piggy-back with it other constitutional rights,
and if it does, which or all of these rights are so piggy-backed.
I. Co NsTITUTONAL= OF U. S. PRESNCE IN VIETNAM
A discussion of the constitutionality of our presence in Viet-
nam, and of the constitutional Congressional power to conscript,
so as to understand the existence and enforcement of the con-
stitutional right to counsel within the System, requires at least
some degree of exploration of the unadulterated exercise of
such power. Conceding the constitutionality of and the con-
scripting power's existence generally does not concede the
validity of the conscripting power's exercise and continuation
with respect to Southeast Asia. Here we must develop the
overall climate of political and constitutional liberties, against
which the particular necessity of national requirements are to
be cast. It is in the light of "this mood and with this perspective
that the issue before [us] must be approached."4
A. Background and Source of Power to Conscript
Congress, of course, is the source of the conscription laws, but
it must go to the Constitution's article I, section 8, clause 11
for its power to declare5 war, and to clause 12 for its power "To
raise and support Armies" (and to clause 13 "To provide and
4. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the Steel Seizure Case). See also note 62 infra.
5. The present verb was substituted for "make" in the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787 so as to enable the Chief Executive (only) to repel sudden
attacks. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONvENTIoN 318 (M. Farrand ed. 1937),
hereinafter cited as "REcoRs." See also F. WoRmUTH, THE VIErNAm WAR:
THE PRESIDENT VERSUS THE CONSTITuTI N 3-4 (1968), a Center Occasional
Paper, hereinafter cited as WORMUTH, VIETNAM; this writer leans heavily on
Wormuth for various aspects. See also note 16 infra, and M. PusEY, THE
WAY WE Go To WAR (1969), who argues in the same vein but discloses
numerous instances of Presidential "wars," where troops have been sentabroad
by Presidential action.
In the Articles of Confederation there was a provision in art. IX, para. 6,
that "The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war
... unless nine states assent to the same. .. ." Thus a declaration of war
seems technically to have been required even though another nation physically
1970]
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maintain a Navy")-" The quoted operative constitutional term
is "raise" (and "provide"), as it is in the achievement of this
power that conscription may become necessary. 7
attacked the Confederation-that is, if "make" and "engage" have any parallel
meaning. Within the historic context, they should.
Under the Constitution's term and background, however, such a declaration
is apparently not required when another nation attacks us. The Prize Cases,
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863). Such an attack occurred at Pearl Harbor.
But what of the situation when Germany then declared war-was a declaration
required, or were we automatically at war so that the President could exercise
all, even delegated, war powers? Hamilton disagreed with Jefferson on this
point, feeling that "when a foreign nation declares" war then "any declaration
on the part of Congress is nugatory; it is at least unnecessary." 7 Works 746f.
(1851). See also 2 Stat. 129-30 (1802), apparently in agreement, and the
majority opinion in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, clause 13 bears upon aspects subsequent to the
raising and providing of these forces, while clauses 15-16 deal with the state
militias, and these are to be distinguished from the army powers. Arver v.
United States, 245 U.S. 366, 382 (1918) (opinion by Chief Justice White for
a unanimous Court).
7. The constitutional power of Congress to conscript was upheld in Arver
v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 382 (1918). See note 33 infra, and Cox v.
Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1918). But that was a war-time measure and during war;
in time of peace an "urgent necessity" may seem to likewise uphold this power.
Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944) (per Black, with Murphy dis-
senting). See the language in note 42 infra, even though in this case the Selec-
tive Service & Training Act of 1940 was being applied to a final order to
report on September 2, 1942, when we were at war, and the only point was the
procedural one of being able to offer a defense (of exemption as a minister)
in a criminal prosecution for a wilful failure to report for induction (and not
in habeas corpus proceedings after induction), which contention the Court
rejected. However, when the war was over the Court, but now on the ground
of lack of board jurisdiction, permitted this defense in a prosecution as occured
in the Falbo situation. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). Thus, in
time of peace where no great emergency or urgent necessity exists "to mobilize
national manpower with the speed which that necessity and understanding
required," so that no "dire consequences might flow" Falbo, at 551-52, differ-
ent answers may be given than what in wartime may be required (the Estep
case). And different questions may also arise. Is a claimed exemption (total
or partial) because of conscientious scruples a constitutional right, as in
United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D.C. Mass. 1969), cert. granted,
396 U.S. 812, where Judge Wyzanski held the 1967 Act as here applied vio-
lated the first and fifth amendments. See also Welsh v. United States, 404
F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 816, to be argued with
Sisson ; cf., United States v. Noyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 483, 40 C.M.R. 195 (1969)
(affirming the court-martial conviction of Air Force Captain Noyd for refus-
ing to instruct student pilots even though Noyd's "humanism" opposed the
Vietnam War only as unjust). On procedures, as in Falbo and Estep, see note
133 inIra.
It should be further noted that in his Sisson opinion Judge Wyzanski felt a
person conscientiously objecting not to war in general but to a particular type
of war "might reflect a more discriminating study of the problem, a more
sensitive conscience, and a deeper spiritual understanding." Sisson at 908. This
distinction between the general and the partial objector therefore raised a
constitutional question as it amounted to a discrimination of certain religious
beliefs over others. Along the same lines was the acquittal of Leslie C. Bowen,
who refused induction. The federal district judge overturned a long-standing
Selective Service practice under § 6-J of the Act which had the effect of
refusing conscientious-objector status to Roman Catholics because that religion
did not disapprove of all wars, and held that Bowen could conscientiously
oppose a particular (the Vietnam) war. United States v. Bowen (D.C. Calif.
1969), as reported in N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1969, at 10, col. 1.
[Vol. 22
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The historical background of these terms discloses that in
early America "the right [of the Colonies] to enforce military
service was unquestioned" and that at least nine of the states
"expressly sanctioned" conscription by their laws." During the
Revolutionary War the Continental Congress had requisitioned
forces through the states,9 unfortunately without too much
success,10 and under the Articles of Confederation the Congress
enjoyed little of the war powers."' While Art. IX, par. 5, of
the Articles contained a provision giving the Congress power "to
make [binding] requisitions from each state for its quota" of
land forces, the next clause required "the legislature of each
state . . . [to] raise the men." Article VII opened by referring
to the "land forces [which] are raised by any state for the com-
mon defense," and in the same sentence it was again mentioned
that it was the state legislatures "by whom such forces shall be
raised .... 12 In effect, therefore, the naval forces had been
placed in the national hands13 because collective, not individual,
action only could be had, and also because the landlocked states
might otherwise not contribute sufficiently but the former
procedure of state-requisition remained with respect to the land
forces. The actual methods of raising such naval or land forces
were left to the national and state governments to formulate
their own procedures.
8. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1918), supra note 6,
at 379 and 380 respectively, with the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 being
quoted and n.3 giving references to the laws of other eight states (all prior to
1789 except for two, in 1780 and 1784). See, e.g., SSLR PRACICE MANUAL
§ 2 at 1003-04, for other background material.
9. Congress had also authorized enlistments for one year, later ineffectually
increased to three (with a bounty) at Washington's remonstrance. Previous
Colonial "wars" had found volunteers, not conscripts, fighting, but there bor-
der and Indian battles occurred.
10. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, at 380-81 (1918), referring to
the "earnest requests by Washington to Congress that a demand be made upon
the States to resort to drafts to fill their quotas . .. "
11. Art. IX opened by giving Congress "the sole and exclusive right and
power of determining on peace and war"; art. VI, para. 5, referred to "a dec-
laration of war by the United States in Congress assembled .... " But in the
other articles and paragraphs a distinction was made between peace and war
which enabled the states, during peace, to dominate in practically all aspects,
while during war they still were able to control the appointment of all land
officers save the generals (Congress, in art. IX, para. 5, was given power "to
build and equip a navy") and to determine how to raise forces amongst other
things. Arts. VI-IX.
12. Art IX, para. 5, in several additional places kept pairing the states and
raising of men, so that the words "raise" and "raised" were used six times in
that one paragraph.
13. Art VI, para. 4, denied to the states, in time of peace, the power to keep
any vessels of war "except such number only, as shall be deemed necessary by
the" Congress.
1970]
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In the Constitutional Convention of 1787 the Randolph or
Virginia Plan opened by resolving that the Articles should be
corrected to better accomplish their ends relating to the "com-
mon defense," but provided no war powers as such except that
"the National Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the
Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation
.... M4 The Randolph Plan thus did not change anything, and
the later Patterson or New Jersey Plan was silent in this re-
spect.15 It was not until the Committee of Detail reported out
its proposals that the legislative powers specifically included one
"to raise armies .... 116 Subsequent discussion unanimously
added "and support" to the infinitive, and then immediately
occurred the following:
Mr. Gerry took notice that there was [no] check here
against standing armies in time of peace. The existing
Congress is so constructed that it cannot of itself main-
tain an army. This would not be the case under the new
system. The people were jealous on this head, and great
opposition to the plan would spring from such an omis-
sion. He suspected that preparations of force were now
making against it. (He seemed to allude the activity of
the Governor of New York at this crisis in disciplining
the militia of that State.) He thought an army dan-
gerous in time of peace and could never consent to a
power to keep up an indefinite number. He proposed
that there shall not be kept up in time of peace more
than - thousand troops. His idea was that the
blank should be filled up with two or three thousand.
17
Although Gerry's objections proved unavailing in the Con-
vention, they represented the deep sentiments of the people
generally, and Madison felt compelled in The Federalist to
14. Proposed May 29, 1787, 1 RECORDs 20-21, respectively in the first and
sixth resolutions.
15. Proposed June 15, 1787, 1 REcoRDs 242-45.
16. Reported August 6, 1787, 2 REcoRDS 182 at 330, followed by "To build
and equip fleets," which was also unanimously changed to its present consti-
tutional language. The Committee also proposed (conditionally) to eliminate
the powers of the states to keep troops, warships, and other items. 2 RcoRas
182, at 187. On the power "To make war," see WoRMUTH, VETNA_, supra
note 5. See also collection of articles in THE VIETNAm WAR AND ITERNA-
TIONrAL WAR (Falk ed., 1968), and his publication THE Six LEGAL DrmsEN-
SIONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR (1968 pamphlet).
17. 2 REcos at 329. The motion then made by Elbridge Gerry (Mass.)
and Luther Martin (Md.) to limit the number of the peacetime army was
nevertheless unanimously defeated. See Martin's "Genuine Information" as to
the proceedings of the Convention, delivered to the Maryland legislature. 3
REcoRs at 207.
[Vol 2
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defend at length this grant of peacetime power.' Gerry's
language is indicative of the fact that throughout the history of
colonial and then united America the words "liberty" and
"freedom", whether of conscience or politics or otherwise, were
part of the national heritage. Thus, when James Monroe, as
Secretary of War under Madison, had a conscription bill intro-
duced in order to wage war more effectively in 1812, the
successful opposition "substantially rested upon the incompati-
bility of compulsory military service with free government .... -19
"English and American tradition has long opposed military
conscription. Back of this opposition there is a mental attitude
which has been bluntly characterized . .. as a manifestation of
the Anglo-Saxon's sense of the sanctity of the individual, [and]
his repugnance to outside coercion ...."20
So, too, did the people generally demand procedural regu-
larities, and the recognition of these several procedural and
substantive ideas was the price of ratification of the Consti-
tution.21 Furthermore, while records of the Convention debates,
The Federalist, and the ratifying Convention debates are barren
of any reference to the particular right to counsel question here
explored, as are the statutes and War Department regulations
for the first seventy-five years of national life,22 still the warp
and woof of the country's fabric is indelibly imprinted with the
need for constitutional minimums in procedures in order to
18. No. 41, at 261 (Mod. Lib. Ed.), asking "But was it necessary to give
an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets;
and of maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in war?" He felt the answer
"to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion" and
yet indulged in a lengthy one. Inter alia he remarked, based on the geographi-
cal and technological conditions then prevailing, that Great Britain was "im-
pregnable" and so could not "cheat the public into an extensive peace estab-
lishment," and that unless the Union was now created so that England's
example could be followed, the separate states "will present liberty everywhere
crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes.' Id. at 263.
19. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, at 385 (1918), although White
pointed out that Congress nevertheless had this power, despite such opposition,
and that "peace came before the bill was enacted." The Mexican War volun-
teers sufficed.
20. J. RANDATL, CoxsTiTuTo NAL PROBLEms UmE LixcoLN 239-40 (rev.
ed. 1951).
21. For background material see Forkosch, Who Are The "People" ins the
Preamble to the Constitution?, 19 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 644, 697-703 (1968).
22. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, Ch. VII, 1 Stat, at L. 49, established a Department
of War. See also history and references at 384-88 of Selective Service Draft
Law Cases 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
1970]
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provide a proper notice and fair hearing before one's life,
liberty, or property can be taken.
23
This need, enhanced in recent decades,2 4 has assumed somewhat
large proportions if only to provide the people, in this complex
society where the decision-making processes may ignore them,
25
with a minimum opportunity to be properly heard on various
matters. But until the Civil War no individual could seek a
hearing on a question of or in the process of conscription. The
reason that this was true is simple-where men voluntarily enlist
they do not attempt to prevent oath-takings. Until 186326
voluntary enlistment was used by the federal and state govern-
ments, although the French levee en masse of 1793 suggested the
23. See, e.g., Forkosch, American Democracy and Procedural Due Process,
24 BKL . L. REv. 173 (1958), and citations and references to areas such as
political organizations, religious bodies, educational institutions, fraternities
and clubs, etc. In United States v. David Zimmerman, (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a
motion to dismiss a draft-evasion indictment argued that the founding fathers
did not grant the conscripting power to Congress during peacetime except to
suppress insurrection, to repel invasion, and to execute the laws; as of this
writing the decision is pending.
24. See FonnoscH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Chaps. 18-20 (2d ed. 1969), here-
inafter cited as FORKoSCn, CONSTITUTIONAL. This need is exemplified by the
cases decided in the criminal, as well as the civil, areas since the 1950's.
25. The numerous governmental and private decisions being made in fields
of ecology, and technology, as well as research, play with the lives of the
people directly and indirectly affected, but without their voices being given an
opportunity to be heard. For example, is the new Alaska oil find to be ex-
ploited by a pipeline or by tankers? Canada may have a voice in the latter
aspect. But as to the former how may the Alaskan citizen, or any American
citizen, be heard? The fact that the natural balance of the frontier may be
altered, the esthetic and other benefits destroyed, argue for hearings, objec-
tions and open decisions openly reached. See generally Wheeler, Bringing
Science Under Law, THE CENTER MAGAZINE HI 59 (1969).
26. The belief of the North in the shortness and relative unimportance of
the war is found in Lincoln's (congressionally unsanctioned) proclamation of
April 15, 1861, which called for 75,000 volunteers to serve for three months.
Then on May 3d, he also called for 40 additional volunteer regiments, and
40,000 three-year regular enlistments, leaving the recruiting, etc. to the states.
It was not until July 4th that Congress authorized the President to recruit
500,000 men for the duration. See also note 31 infra. Ad hoc regiments were
also created by citizens who received colonels' commissions, or by companies
who would organize and elect their own officers. The Confederacy at first
utilized about the same voluntary recruitment system for its own forces, but
adopted its "national" conscription a year before the North did. It was on
March 3, 1863, that the first national conscription act was passed by the
United States Congress. The law was poorly conceived and poorly executed.
It still included the states in its calculations, if not in the enforcement. The
first draft lottery in 1863 caused a riot in New York City, requiring federal
troops to suppress it. There were three more drafts the following year. In
numbers, the draft was a failure, it being effective only in stimulating volun-
teers who received bounties.
(Vol. 22
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formula for a national and democratically27 selected army.
When the first conscription law28 was enacted in the United
States on March 3, 1863,29 those called were able to substitute
others or to pay commutation money.30 This would explain the
absence of constitutional or other attacks on the laws or their
operations.31 When subsequent legislation was attacked the
arguments were usually couched in such terms as these: thirteenth
amendment violations, depriving the states of the right to "a
well-regulated Militia" (second amendment), lack of congres-
sional power to send draftees overseas, improper delegations,
etc.3
2
27. The late Senator Robert Taft rejected the view "that the compulsory
draft is a democratic system. I deny that it has anything to do with de-
mocracy .... [I]t is far more typical of totalitarian nations than of demo-
cratic nations. The theory behind it leads directly to totalitarianism. It is
absolutely opposed to the principles of individual liberty which have been
considered a part of American democracy." Quoted in N.Y.U. Commentator,
Nov. 12, 1969, at 2, col. 2.
28. However, was there not "federal" conscription practiced by the states
under and pursuant to Lincoln's prior calls upon these sovereigns for troops?
For the cases opposed to such power and its exercise, as well as other aspects,
see RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL, supra note 20, at 252-56.
29. See 4:2:3 12 Stat. at L. 731, Chapt. LXXV, 37th Cong., and for back-
ground and other aspects see RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL, supra note 20, at
241-74. See. 1 of the 1863 Act declared all "able-bodied male citizens" and
aliens who had filed their declarations of intention to become citizens, between
20 and 45, "to constitute the national forces, and [they] shall be liable to
perform military service" except as thereafter provided, with the provisions as
to enrollment and drafting not being relevant here. For the prior Executive
calls and proclamations based upon the authority Lincoln allegedly derived
from 1 Stat. at 4:2:3 L. 424 (1795), see W. DUNNING, ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL
WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 16-18 (1931) (hereinafter called DUNNING, Es-
SAYS), and also Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, at 386-87 (1918) for
the subsequent four legislative draft calls. The constitutionality of these laws
was not attacked federally, but in one state court they were upheld. In Kneed-
ler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863), induction was enjoined but the case was
overruled in 45 Pa. 295 (1864) (for background of the politics involved see
RANDALL, CoNsTiTuTioNAL, supra note 20, at 11-12), and the identical constitu-
tional provisions in the Confederacy, with analogous legislation, resulted in like
decisions by the Southern courts (Selective Draft Law Cases, supra note 6, at
388, giving citations).
30. Both practices having been allowed under the old militia systems, al-
though the latter (commutation) was dropped by 4:2:3 13 Stat. at L. 379
(1894).
31. For Lincoln's strong views upholding the laws see LINCOLN'S COMPLrTE
WORKS VII, 49-57 (Nicolay & Hay, eds., 1894). In his message to Congress
of July 4th (see note 26 supra) requesting approval, Lincoln said: "Whether
strictly legal or not [the draft calls] were ventured under what appeared to be
popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then as now that Congress
would readily ratify them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond
the constitutional competency of Congress." In 1931 DUNNING, ESSAYS, supra
note 29, at 18, stated that "[t]his frank substitution of a 'popular demand' for
a legal mandate, as a basis for executive action, is characteristic of the times."
32. See the Court's cavalier rejection of these in the Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366, at 389-90 (1918); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333
(1916) ; and Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390 (1918). See also the background
and references by Douglas in his Holmes dissent, infra note 44, at 939, 948.
1970]
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B. Necessity for Conscription v. lndividal' Right to Freedom
Perhaps the most basic and powerful general objection to
conscription 8 from which other arguments may flow, was, and
still remains, the objection based upon freedom and liberty:34
"We the People" have banded together for certain purposes;
that where one of the ends of government is to attain and to
"secure the blessings of liberty" (and happiness) of the individ-
ual, then the means therefore should not be perverted so as to
jeopardize or cancel these blessings;35 that any government in-
fringing upon these liberties or depriving the people of them
breaches its duties and obligations so that such impermissible
(unconstitutional) conduct may be opposed;30 or even if not
objected to, or if the collectivity is compelled to "provide for the
common defense" because of a grave situation which necessitates
a limited exception, there must be a tailoring, if at all possible,
to the exact needs so as not to excessively curtail such liberty.
"[Tihe phrase 'war power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic
incantation to support any exercise of congressional power which
can be brought within its ambit. '[Elven the war power does not
remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liber-
ties."37
33. These laws have, of course been generally upheld. See note 7 supra;
Annot., 129 A.L.R. 1171 (1940); Bernstein, Conscription and the Constitution,
53 A.B.A.J. 708 (1967); and citations in SSLR PRAcricE MANUAL § 3 at
1005.
34. Legislation in the colonies (and at times found in their charters and
grants) early adopted all, or parts of, those English "statutes ... as declare
the rights and liberties of the subjects". South Carolina Statutes 1712, and
Andrew Hamilton's argument at the 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger as well
as Alexander Hamilton's (and others') in the 1804 appeal of Harry Croswell
(see Forkosch, Freedom of the Press: Croswell's Case, 33 FORD. L. Rav. 415
[1965]), build upon and extended these rights and liberties, as did the num-
erous tracts and writings before and after the Revolution. An example is the
Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776.
35. See, e.g., Forkosch, Does "Secure the Blessings of Liberty" in the
Preamble Mandate Judicial Actionf The Federal Republic of Germany, in
Art. 3(3) of its Basic Law (i.e., Constitution) of 1949, states:
No one may be compelled against his conscience to render war -
service as an armed combatant Details will be regulated by a Fed-
eral law. Of course our statutory conscientious objector privilege
parallels this constitutional right, but a constitutional right here
indicates a fundamental basis for its claim, with no impairment
statutorily or administratively possible (assuming a vigilant Execu-
tive or judiciary).
36. For example, the fourteenth amendment prevents the states from depriv-
ing a person of "liberty", but what is encompassed by this term? See,
FORICOSCH, CONSUTIrONOAL 408-11. The first amendment speaks of "freedom",
not liberty (although "liberty" is found in the fifth amendment's due process
clause), and the two terms are not necessarily treated alike. Id. at 408, n.41.
A state infringing these liberties, and any penumbral aspects (Id. 435-36),
may be opposed as may also the federal government
37. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967), (per Warren,
c.).
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The contract theory of government was most influential in
the Eighteenth Century, regardless of its philosophical error
or practical inapplicability. For example, in their Declaration
of Independence the colonists argued that the King's keeping
"among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the
consent of our legislature" breached "the consent of the gov-
enrned" and that "whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends," which were "liberty and the pursuit
of happiness," then "it is the right of the people to alter or
abolish it," so as "to effect their safety and happiness" through
a new government. These arguments built upon the political
philosophers Hobbes and Rousseau, with the latter's Social
Contract being somewhat of a contemporary of the colonists'
Declaration. But more to the instant point was Hobbe's
Leviathan, in which he argued that security was the ultimate
desideratum impelling all to enter into a social contract and to
surrender power to one who would enforce peace, and that
resistance and revolution were justified when, for example, the
sovereign failed to protect them, or when he threatened to take
their lives as in compelling service in the army, for such an
existence was just as lacking in security as was the bellum
omnium contra omnes in a state of nature (from which escape
was sought through the contract).
The compelling exception which may be urged to overcome
the claim of full and complete freedom and liberty, that is,
freedom governmentally unimpaired via conscription, is self-
preservation. Just as the individual has a right to life and its
continuation and may therefore kill in self-defense, so must the
nation also have such a collective right of self-defense, that is,
be able to conscript without hindrance, but only, to use Suther-
land's piercing phrase, "in the last extremity .... ,,3s Ghandi,
of course, preached the contrary philosophy, although Christ may
be utilized to illustrate that peace has exceptions, such as driving
the money changers from the Temple. Particular and limited
illegalities are sometimes exceptions inherent in our system of
legalities,39 and it is a commonplace that every general principle
or rule of law has exceptions. But there is a corollary to this,
namely, that exceptions are limited in scope to the facts and
38. United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931); quoted by
Butler in Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934); and in United
States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, at 907 (D.C. Mass. 1969).
39. Forkosch, Attacks on the Constitution, Violence, and the Necessity for
Disobedience, 35 Foiw. L. REv. 71 (1966).
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circumstances. They do not ordinarily expand to cover other
situations, and they are to be applied only when the same or
very substantially similar facts are presented. "It has become
axiomatic that '[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone
in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms."'
40
Therefore, conceding the exceptional power to conscript in a
real and unquestioned emergency of such grave and horrendous
consequences that no general or particular objection to its exer-
cise can be raised, i.e., an "actual declaration of war by Congress
in a clear-cut situation,"41 can such exceptional power neverthe-
40. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967).
41. To "actual declaration of war by Congress" I have added "in a clear-
cut situation", and see also the qualification in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635,
at 668 (1863): "By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare
a national or foreign war. It cannot declare war against a State or any num-
ber of States, by virtue of any clause in the Constitution." Douglas, J., infra
note 44, makes no such other qualification, and in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), Chief Justice Warren's majority language was,
"[tihe constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies ... is broad
and sweeping." Justice Douglas' dissent felt this "is undoubtedly true in times
when, by declaration of Congress, the Nation is in a state of war. The under-
lying and basic problem in this case, however, is whether conscription is
permissible in the absence of a declaration of war." Id. at 389. Although the
actuality of war via foreign physical attack on the nation is not mentioned, it
is undoubtedly included in the views of the Court. The President has power
to repel the attack. (See notes 5 and 16 supra). Quaere: Absent a congres-
sional conscription law, has the President any power to conscript generally
(leaving aside national guards, etc.)? While here not involved, it would
appear not, albeit Lincoln's actions, later congressionally approved, might
justify conscription by the President alone (supra notes 26, 28, and 31).
Nevertheless, does not the ability of Congress to declare war permit the
mere act itself to turn into a bootstrap operation as envisaged in the text
which follows? To illustrate, assume the conditions in the text's next sen-
tence, but with a declaration of war by Congress now occurring-for Justice
Douglas, and therefore for all the others, this would suffice. But see Justice
Douglas' footnotes in Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 937 (1968)
(infra note 44) where there is a possible distinction between conscription "for
armed, combatant service overseas and those drafted for civilian work (the
Holmes situation)". Why should this be so? Cannot a small band of wilful
and determined men (as President Wilson characterized his opponents) plunge
the nation into an armed camp, if not immediate conflict, and this, in turn,
create international problems easing us into war? See also notes 46 and 47
infra.
All hypothetical possibilities, of course, and not even probabilities, but in
this area do we not deal in these, despite Justice Holmes' caustic view that
"[i]t is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point out short-
cormngs of this sort." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). Later I develop
the problem and the proposed solution further in discussing the question of
jurisdictional fact, infra notes 67 et seq., although heretofore, for the purposes
there discussed, I have assumed that the constitutionality of the Selective
Service System and law "is settled, at least as of today." Therefore, "[w]hile
it is concluded that the 1965 addition [denouncing draft card burning] is aconsttutional exercising of Congressional power . ... the independent judiciaryshould not be influenced by Congressional emotion or facts other 
than strictl
legal." Forkosch, Draft Card Burn;ing-Effectuation and constiutonalty of"
the 1965 Arendtent, 32 Bsa,r L. Rsv. 303, 320, 332 (1966) (hereinaftercited as Forkosch, Draft Card Burning). The law was upheld in United 
Stat s
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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less be carried over into and utilized by the government in any
and all other, but not analogous, situations?
42
The question is not rhetorical, for is this not the government's
general contention? Let us assume a world in which absolutely
no cloud marred the horizon of peace, no possible fear could be
raised of a future change, and world order, law, justice, equal-
ity, etc. reigned. In such a world could the congressional power
to conscript under a declaration of war be now constitutionally
utilized? 43  If the answer be yes,44 then can not the Congress
become a collective dictator at will? By its simple-majority
declaration of war may it not seize private property, regardless
42. In Falbo, 320 U.S. at 555-56 (1944), Murphy's dissent opened:
This case presents another aspect of the perplexing problem of
reconciling basic principles of justice with military needs in war-
time. Individual rights have been recognized by our jurisprudence
only after long and costly struggles. They should not be struck
down by anything less than the gravest necessity. We assent to
their temporary suspension only to the extent that they constitute
a clear and present danger to the effective prosecution of the war
and only as a means of preserving those rights undiminished for
ourselves and future generations. Before giving such an assent,
therefore, we should be convinced of the existence of a reasonable
necessity and be satisfied that the suspension is in accordance with
the legislative intention.
Of course, even the latter's "intention" cannot give it power to declare war if
no such "gravest necessity" exists at the time, and the language of Douglas,
although expressed in a different context, is apropos: "If no United States
court can inquire into the lawfulness of his detention, the military have
acquired, contrary to our traditions . . . a new and alarming hold on us."
Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 201 (1948).
43. Since the Supreme Court assumes questions for the purpose of "illus-
trat[ing] the gravity and seriousness of the conclusion," so may we. Hirota v.
MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 204 (1948) (opinion by Douglas, J.).
44. Cf., dissent by Douglas in denial of certiorari in Holmes v. United
States, 391 U.S. 936, 937-38 (1968):
Petitioner asks this Court to decide whether a draft of men into
the Armed Forces in time of peace is constitutionally permissible.
In the absence of a declaration of war, he argues, a draft is not
authorized and is equivalent to involuntary servitude. The Court of
Appeals held that Congress' [sic] power to conscript men into the
Armed Forces was not so limited, and the Government, opposing
certiorari, states that '[elven assuming that the present time is one
of "peace", it has long been settled that the power to raise armies
by conscription is not limited to periods of war or national emer-
gency,' citing [cases].
It is clear from our decisions that conscription is constitutionally
permissible when there has been a declaration of war [although see
note 41 mtpra]. But we have never decided whether there may be
conscription in the absence of a declaration of war. Our cases sug-
gest (but do not decide) that there may not be.
See also his last paragraph at 949, and also his dissent the same day in Hart
v. United States, 391 U.S. 956, 958, 960 (1968), and the week before in
United States v. O'Brien, 341 U.S. 367, 389-91 (1968). See also note 49 infra.
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of whether or not just compensation is required;45 conscript and
assign draftees to at least national projects (and businesses
connected or interreleated thereto) on the ground that these
are necessarily of aid to the "war" effort; curtail many of the
economic, social, and other activities and needs of the people;
and even limit, perhaps, nonessential liberties?46 And, sep-
arately or additionally, may not the President bootstrap himself
into somewhat of a like situation when, "having, on his own
responsibility, sent American troops abroad, [claims he] derives
from that act 'affirmative power' to seize" private property,
in other words, "he has invested himself with 'war powers.'12
47
If the latter is denied this increased power4" then so must the
former, and no "political question" intrudes or should intrude
to prevent a judicial examination into and determination of
these questions.
49
45. On the necessity of just compensation, Black has gone so far as to
desire that it be paid when a picketing injunction was upheld and thereby
permitted union picketers to trespass (as against state laws), thereby resulting
in a diminution of business, etc. See for one illustration of his views, Amal-
gamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968), discussed in Forkosch, Picketing in Shopping Centers, 26 WAsH. &
LEE L. Rzv. 250, 259 (1969).
46. On this last, see note 37 supra, rejecting curtailment of "essential liber-
ties", so that an implication of permissible curtailment of nonessential liberties
seems in order. On seizure of private homes see the third amendment reject-
ing any quartering of soldiers in peace without the owner's consent, and in
times of war only as prescribed by law. See also note 41 supra. Analytically,
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 136 (1866) and Ex parte Merryman,
17 Fed. Cas. 144, (No. 9, 487) (C.C. Md. 1861), may be used. In the former,
the Court, splitting 5 to 4 only on the question whether it was or "was not in
the power of Congress to authorize" the Military Commission to sit, on the
facts as the majority saw them, felt Congress had no such power, and neither
did the President as Commander in Chief.
47. Jackson, J., concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 642-43 (1952), rejected these contentions because "no doctrine
that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming
than that a President... can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal
affairs of the country by his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to
some foreign venture."
48. But see WORnUTH, VIETNAM, supra note 5 where, at p.2, the author
begins: "Defying the critics of his Vietnamese adventure in a speech in
Omaha on June 30, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson said: 'The American
people have chosen only one man to decide.. . .nevertheless, the State De-
partment has officially asserted that the President has the power to initiate
war on his sole authority.., but as an act of supererogation he has obtained
the permission of Congress in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August 10,
1964." Professor Wormuth's piercing analysis effectively destroys these con-
tentions.
49. See note 44 supra, on other aspects, and on justiciability and political
question see dissents in Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967). On the
Congressional-Presidential distinction of power and effectuation (of the
power), see United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967) (and see also Douglas' dissent). The political
question doctrine has received quite a few blows in recent years, FoRxoscH,
CONSTrTuTONAL 73-74, the latest being in Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S.
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C. Nationa Emergencies and the Power to Conscript
If the analysis to this point, and the preceding two divisions
are valid or acceptable, then one might logically conclude that
an examination is required of the factual "national emergency"
within which the congressional power to conscript is,5
° or is
486 (1969), in which Warren also pointed out that "[w]e need express no
opinion about the appropriateness of coercive relief in this case, for petitioners
sought a declaratory judgment....
The losing efforts by Stewart and Douglas in the Mora and Mitchell cases,
supra, to get the questions they propounded to the Court for a decision on the
merits, have received some encouragement by the Massachusetts statute,
enacted April 1, 1970, and signed by the Governor the following day, which
provides that that state's servicemen can refuse, in the absence of a declara-
tion of war by Congress, to participate in "armed hostilities" that are "not an
emergency" and "not otherwise authorized in the powers granted to the
President as Commander in Chief." The state's attorney general must defend
the rights of those so refusing and he is directed to take "appropriate action"'
(e.g., an original suit) before the Supreme Court and, if necessary (because
of a dismissal of such original action), go to a lower federal court (no other
enforcement machinery is provided). Similar bills were filed in other states,
New York, California and Rhode Island. Massachusetts, of course, has a
history of such defiance. For example, there was its 1814 call for a convention
to reject the military conscription bill then in Congress. As of this writing no
action by the attorney general of Massachusetts has been taken, but one serv-
iceman's individual suit challenging the President's authority to commit troops
to Vietnam combat zones was dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction, and
the first circuit one hour later denied his request for an injunction under the
suit to prevent his transfer to Fort Dix, New Jersey. N.Y. Times, April 4,
1970, at 15, col. 2, referring to Pfc. John Griffin's action. Must the attorney
general now take further "appropriate action" in this suit which would mean
going higher from either court or both?
In one aspect such a Massachusetts statute may be castigated as another
illustration of the discredited doctrine of interposition, but it is suggested that
the doctrine seeks to prevent the federal government (which includes the
judiciary) from enforcing its constitutional and proper power by interposing
the state between the nation and the local citizen; now, however, the state is
seeking to aid the federal government in disposing, at least judicially and on
the merits, of questions and problems which are sapping the vitality and power
of the nation. Furthermore, did Ellis Arnall "interpose" in Georgia v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) when the Supreme Court accepted an
original bill against twenty railroads to enjoin them from rate fixing? The
parens patriae doctrine was recognized as sufficient to sustain the state's action.
But cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923), rejecting the
state's standing to contend, in an original suit, that the federal Maternity Act
was unconstitutional, and holding "no justiciable controversy either in its own
behalf or as the representative of its citizens" was present by the state. (The
Frothingham aspect of the case, i.e., the individual who sued and whose case
was combined with the state's on the Court review, may have been overturned
by Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 [1968], but the state determination is seem-
ingly still the law.)
However, the basic problem is still the very practical one of whether the
Court, especially as reconstituted today, will be willing to do what the Warren
Court refused to do-confront the President with an ultimatum and risk a
Jackson-Lincoln-Roosevelt response.
50. "It is always open to judicial inquiry whether the exigency still exists
upon which the continued operation of the law depends." Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442 (1934). Justice Hughes was interpreting
and applying the Contract Clause, art. I, § 10, to a state's mortgage mora-
torium law during the depression years. See also his judicial findings at444-45.
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continued,' 1 to be exercised. And, it follows that if this emer-
gency is not a sufficiently grave and impelling one, unquestion-
ably calling for the exercise of this awesome power to conscript
and to consign, then the judicial branch 2 has power so to declare
and to either negate 3 or modify the means being used. This is
true despite the express power superficially granted generally
and without specific limitation to Congress to "raise" forces.54
Powers are not necessarily to be exercised merely because they
exist or inhere in a body; if this were so, then unchecked and
unlimited applications would, in effect, make for unchecked and
unlimited powers.55 Nonuse, of course, does not cause a power
to atrophy. However, the nonuse of a power, save in well-defined
situations and under particular conditions, does make for such a
continued limitation to analogous circumstances.56 The active
and immediate threat of war which existed prior to Pearl Harbor
and which was responsible for the conscription act of 1940, does
not automatically5 7 justify the revival of this act under the eir-
51. See East N.Y. Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1945),
disclosing the legislature's factual inquiry prior to extensions of the mortgage
moratorium law, and Frankfurter's acceptance of this "empiric process of
legislation at its fairest: frequent reconsideration, intensive study of the con-
sequences of what has been done, readjustment to changing conditions, and
safeguarding the future on the basis of responsible forecasts." See also note 78
infra.
52. Neither of the other two branches will, as is obvious, and the local and
appeal boards do not have this power or jurisdiction, Hart v. U.S., 391 U.S.
956, 960 (1968), leaving it therefore in the lap of the judiciary.
53. As it did in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), overturning the N.I.RLA. of 1933, albeit on commerce grounds and
improper delegation.
54. But see notes 41 and 83, and references therein.
.55. Does the upholding of the substantive power of conscription in turn
permit its exercise by allocating the men drafted to service in private indus-
try? In United States v. Copeland, 126 F. Supp. 734 (D. Conn. 1954), a selec-
tive service regulation providing for such an assignment of a conscientious
objector against his will was denounced as there unauthorized, at least in
peacetime, with the decision also being cited for holding that such a draftee
may be assigned to work in hospitals, etc., under the control of states and
their subdivisions, which are not considered as "private" as was the situation
with Copeland who was assigned to work for Goodwill Industries, Inc.
United States v. Hoepker, 223 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
841 (1955). But what of a draftee not otherwise claiming preferential treat-
ment so that no quid pro quo argument might be advanced? Would not an
Orwellian society emerge?
56. See Frankfurter's words in the Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 529, at 610
(1952).
57. See note 51 supra, and also the Japanese Relocation Cases, Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), both upholding detention (see notes 61 and 89 infra), but,
as soon as the imminency of a Japanese attack on the mainland disappeared,
that fact became decisive (though not expressed save in Murphy's concurrence
at 308) in Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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cumstances existing in 1948 or its substitution in 1967.8 Where a
congressional exercise of power ventures beyond its required
borders, then even such a "delegation running riot"5 9 may,
though under and allegedly pursuant to the war power, be
squelched or tamed.(0
That the Supreme Court has exercised such a supervising
power is shown by its 1952 Steel Seizure Case.8 ' If the Justices
may call a President to constitutional account in these matters,
why not the Congress? Development of such judicial power
against one branch should, pars passu, permit the same position
to be taken against the other branch. We, therefore, develop
that precedential decision which involved the Chief Executive's
declaration of a national emergency when a threatened strike
allegedly would slow down, if not halt, steel production required
for munitions and other purposes in the Korean "enterprise".
62
Our participation in Korea, which was sanctioned by and in-
volved the United Nations as well as other countries was, in
this respect, more of a "war" than is Vietnam; yet the Supreme
Court did not hesitate to protect the privately-owned mills now
seized by virtue of a Presidential order. The case is a landmark
decision in constitutional law, and yet not a single Justice
termed the national effort in Korea a "war"; to the contrary,
each of the seven opinion-writers was seemingly careful to
disavow characterizing it as anything but that.08 And all of
them, therefore, did delve deeply into the factual background of
58. Act of September 16, 1940, Ch. 720, 54 Stat. 335; Act of June 4, 1948,
Cb. 417, 62 Stat 604; Act of June 30, 1967, P.L. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100.
59. Justice Cardozo's phrase, concurring in Schzechter Poultry.
60. See note 41 =rpra, and also note 89 infra.
61. Supra note 47.
62. Per Jackson, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
643 (1952). Although six Justices affirmed, all wrote separate opinions,
Black's being the first because of seniority, with Frankfurter, Jackson and
Burton joining his opinion while also writing their own; thus Black's majority
opinion was for only four Justices, with three of them giving additional views.
63. Concerning the judicial terms used, Black only quoted the Government's
contention as to the "theater of war" (343 U.S. at 587) justifying seizure,
which he rejected. Frankfurter mentioned "the Korean conflict" (at 603), and
later spoke in "a time when this country was not at war, in the only constitu-
tional way in which it can be at war" (at 613) (although see note 41, supra).
Douglas wrote of "the emergency" (at 629) and the "present emergency" (at
632). Jackson's term has been quoted, although he also referred to "emer-
gency" (at 649, 650, 651, 652) and earlier had said, "Of course, a state of war
may in fact exist without a formal declaration" (at 642), and "[a]ssuming
that we are in a war de facto" (at 643), as well as referring to the contention
of "'war powers', whatever they are" (at 644). Burton spoke of "a national
emergency of the kind we face" (at 656) and "this emergency" (at 659, 660),
and also felt that "tithe present situation is not comparable to that of an
imminent invasion of threatened attack" which he termed "such catastrophic
situations", while additionally referring to the assumed "mobilized nation
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this emergency situation, 4 for absent war by congressional
declaration or actual foreign attack on us, the President's power
to seize required a more solid base than merely a finding by the
Chief Executive that a national emergency existed sufficient to
justify his conduct.6 5
This approach and exercise of the judicial negativing power in
the Steel Seizure Case was not intimidated by any constitutional
curtain shielding a Presidential subordinate, and was, therefore,
in fact directed against the Chief Executive when he was acting
in this capacity, even though nominally against his delagatee
Sawyer, rather than the President as a delegatee of Congress.
The judiciary in the Powell case66 has likewise tentatively acted
directly against the Congress. This situation and problem is
waging war, or imminently threatened with, total war" (at 659). Clark re-
ferred to assumed "times of grave and imperative national emergency" and an
assumed "gravity of the situation confronting the nation" (at 662). Vinson's
dissent (concurred in by Reed and Minton) contained the following: "these
are extraordinary times" and disclose "the threat of another and more terrify-
ing global conflict"; "iflor almost two full years, our armed forces have been
fighting in Korea... [and] Hostilities have not abated". The dissent also
quoted from the United Nation's reaffirmation "to continue its action in
Korea .... Congressional support of the action in Korea has been mani-
fested by provisions for increased military manpower and equipment and for
economic stabilization" (at 668). The "attack in Korea" (at 670, 671) and all
the other background items of international treaties, obligations, security pro-
grams, etc., prompted Congress to say that "the grim fact... [is] that the
United States is now engaged in a struggle for survival' and that 'it is imper-
ative that we now take those necessary steps to make our strength equal to
the peril of the hour, [which now] granted authority to draft men into the
armed forces" (at 670-71); "assume[d] without deciding that the courts may
go behind a President's finding of fact that an emergency exists" (at 678);"critical situation" (at 680); "the President proclaimed the existence of an
unlimited national emergency" when the "aggression" occurred in Korea (at
700); "these times of peril" (at 704); "the gravity of the emergency" (at
708).
64. "To deny inquiry into the President's power in a case like this, because
of the damage to the public interest to be feared from upsetting its exercise
by him, would in effect always preclude inquiry into challenged power, which
presumably only avowed great public interest brings into action." Per Frank-
furter, 343 U.S. 579, 596.
65. Vinson, in dissent (343 U.S. 579, 709), objected that "[tihere is no
judicial finding [by the majority] that the executive action was unwarranted
because there was in fact no basis for the President's finding of the existence
of ,an emergency. .. ." (See also note 93, infra). Vinson also cites Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399-401 (1932). Sterling involved the power of a
state's chief executive to limit oil production through the promulgation of a
decision that an emergency existed and justifying the use of the state militia
for such purpose. Hughes denounced this and, inter alia, referred to the
analogous federal powers, Id. at 400-01. Despite his objection Vinson, "[flo-
cusing now on the situation confronting the President on the night of April 8,
1952," (343 U.S. 579, 701) when the postponed strike threatened to erupt, also
went into the background and details concerning the seizure.
66. See note 49, supra. The Supreme Court also has so acted as to statutes,
beginning with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). See also
note 74, infra.
[Vol. 22
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss3/2
REQisTRA"T's RiGHT To Couwsm
therefore not the same as the judicial negation of a particular
aspect of the general power attempted to be exercised by a
delegatee as such. Here the delegatee seeks to assert a specific
and valid exercise of an undoubted general power, as where the
Interstate Commerce Commission may have the unquestioned
general power to act, hold hearings, etc., but before its specific
rate-making power may be particularly exercised in such a pro-
ceeding it must first expressly find existing rates to be improper,
whereupon it may then exercise its additional power to fix
reasonable rates.67 A delegatee may, therefore, be limited in its
conduct not only by its delegator's basic statute or executive
order but also by judicially-required conditions precedent. The
condition precedent here is the express finding of a fact before
the next step in the administrative process is permitted. This
requirement has been applied against the President as delegatee
or against his sub-delegatee.6 s
Suppose one acts under a tentative or conditional delegation of
authority which requires a finding of fact that some condition
exists before any action may be instituted. This differs from
the preceding illustration where there was no doubting that the
general power initially to act was present. In this instance the
general power to act at all is put into question. Again, suppose
that a nominally-proper finding of fact is made but this finding
is challenged on grounds that it is not supported by evidentiary
facts within or without the delegatee's order. The question now
is: Has the Supreme Court the judicial power to inquire into
the supporting background of these findings and, if found to
be insufficient, so declare and void the delegatee's act?60 In
the Steel Seizure Case the opinions are rife with factual
67. See, Wichita Ry. & Light Co. v. P.U.C., 260 U.S. 48 (1922), and dis-
cussions in M. FoaxoscH, ADmINISTRArI LAWv §§ 92, 253, 342, 344 (1956),
hereafter cited as FORKOSc H, ADmNISTRATIV, and K. DAVIs, ADAmiSTRATIVE
LAw II, § 16.04 (1958). In the Wiehita case the state statute so construed
was thereafter differently interpreted by the state court. Consolidated Flour
Mills Co. v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 119 Kan. 47, 237 P. 1037 (1925).
68. The cases in the references in note 67 supra, illustrate this, as also does
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). See discussions in Field
v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680-94 (1892), giving numerous such delegations
upheld, as also does Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
69. Concerning one separate objection to such a delegation, that it involves
the delegating and exercising of a legislative power by a body other than
Congress, "[tihe obvious reason why the Supreme Court consistently sanc-
tioned this practice is that the necessities of government demanded delega-
tion.... Whatever the doctrinal formulation-'contingency,' 'ascertainment of
a fact', 'power to fill up the details,' 'mere administrative function,' 'primary
standard,' 'intelligible principle,' or otherwise-the fact of course is that the
power to make law has been lodged in non-legislative hands." W. GELLEaoRN
& C. BysE, CASEs ON ADmiNiSTRATVE LAw 88 (4th ed. 1960).
1I70
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analyses, but it must be repeated that there it was the consti-
tutional ability of the President as such to act, and not as a
delegatee of Congress, which was in issue and denounced; 70 in
the latter delegatee-exercise of power the opinions also go into
this factual analysis to ascertain if a required finding is missing
or lacking in sufficient content.
The wartime Hirabayashi case illustrates how the Supreme
Court, even during this genuine emergency and when a declara-
tion of war existed, did go into these facts, regardless of its
conclusion that the required "basic conclusion of fact" could
be "rationally drawn" therefrom;71 the Hot Oil Case illustrates
how the Supreme Court, even during the gravest economic
emergency to befall the nation in peacetime, did void the Presi-
dent's order when the required finding was missing;72 and while
no case directly in point has been found which illustrates how
the Supreme Court has actually voided the President's order
when a required finding was not supported by evidentiary facts,
the Hirabayashi approach can analogically and conceptually be
used for its converse.78
70. In overseas military matters the President's foreign affairs power may
conceivably be sufficient, without more, to support his exercise of a delega-
tion, as in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936), but at least for the use of the armed forces this is here disputed and
denied.
71. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 103-04 (1943). See also
United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 154-56 (1890), where "[a] minor
question arises on these facts as to whether the petitioner was in fact enlisted."
The Court held yes, but discussed at length the facts and details supporting
this inference of fact and conclusion. The criminal prosecution-draft law cases
developed the jurisdictional or basic fact concept which narrowed judicial
review but permitted a consideration (somewhat) of the evidentiary facts.
Estep v. United States, 329 U.S. 114, 122 (1946) ; United States v. Cook, 225
F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1955), with Douglas' dissent in a denial of a stay, Zig-
mond v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16, 391 U.S. 930, 932 n.3 (1968),
citing Estep, where "we concluded judicial review was available to the extent
of determining in a criminal action whether there was any basis in fact for
the classification given . .. "
72. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 243 U.S. 388, 431 (1935). "The Execu-
tive Order contains no finding, no statement of the grounds of the President's
action . .. in notable contrast with historic practice . . . . And findings by
him as to the existence of the required basis of his action would be necessary
to sustain that action, for otherwise the case would still be one of an unfet-
tered discretion as the qualification of authority would be ineffectual."
73. See also the situation in Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), although
there the military commander was held unauthorized to hold a concededly
loyal American of Japanese descent; if authorized, then perhaps the Murphy
approach to the then-existing facts might be required (see note 92 infra).
Cases are legion which are in the area of delegations to agencies, federal or
state, which are required to have their findings so supported, for a variety of
reasons, on which see cases and references in Foaxoscir, ADmn NisTRATVE.
§ 246e.
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D. The Current Situation
This analysis of the exercise of judicial power against the
President may be used against the Congress, one theory being
that the Constitution is the great and the people, in turn, are
the greatest delegators of powers to all three branches. Thus,
Congress is a delegatee (trustee?) which must not act outside
the boundaries set for it either expressly or by implication.7 4 A
clear-cut statutory violation of these boundaries results ulti-
mately 75 in a judicial caning.76 But where a statute is super-
ficially valid, may the judiciary go behind the legislative facade
and look at the facts? The Supreme Court has not hesitated to
do this when the states are involved in criminal7 7 and civil"h
74. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), rejecting
the effort of Congress to increase the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as outside its powers, the Constitution itself fixing and limiting such
jurisdiction which therefore cannot be touched save by amendment. A counter-
argument may be urged, that just as the President is given vast powers
beyond the shores, so should the Congress, i.e., are (being) fought overseas.
However, there is no "war" under the Constitution, either by declaration or
by an attack on us by Hanoi. There is a legal and technical peace today, and
the question of a sufficiently grave emergency has been and is being exam-
ined here. Conscription is for internal or domestic assignment, not neces-
sarily overseas; and even if for overseas, there is a current (somewhat major)
withdrawal from our foreign commitments in progress, on which more later.
75. In other words, only when a case or controversy is properly before it,
which requires one or more persons to sue, etc. Thus, the probable unconstitu-
tionality of the Alien & Sedition Acts of 1798, which expired by their own
terms on March 3, 1801, could thus not be tested at that time even though
three Supreme Court Justices, while sitting in the circuit courts, upheld their
validity. See also Jackson's dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
287 (1952), and T. ESIERSoT, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL & Cr.m
RIGHTS IN THE UIu STATES, 35-85 (3d ed. 1967).
76. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
77. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968), a fourth amendment
situation requiring a decision only "in the concrete factual context of the
individual case." See also, by analogy, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 8,
9 (1949), where "[flor the first time in the course of the 130 years in which
State prosecutions have come here for review, this Court is today reversing
.on a ground that was urged neither here nor below and that was ex-
plicitly disclaimed on behalf of the petitioner.. ." (Frankfurter dissenting,
Jackson and Burton joining). Douglas, for a majority of five, went into the
record to exhume the fact that no exception to the trial court's (unconstitu-
tional) instruction to the jury was taken, but nevertheless held such defect
required overturning of the verdict of guilty. Vinson and Jackson (Frank-
furter and Burton agreeing) also wrote dissenting opinions. Compare Doug-
las' approach in this civil liberties case with a contrary view when property
only was involved, especially where the protection of consumer interests
against exploitation were considered, as in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591, 617 (1944).
78. In rent control, or jurisdictional (service of process) matters, as to the
former, see, analogically, note 51 supra. See also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller
Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948), a war-emergency holding. Compare Jackson's con-
curring admonitions with Eisen v. Eastman (2d Cir. 1969), where Judge
Friendly wrote, in upholding the statute, "The New York City Rent Control
Law contains an impressive recital of the conditions deemed to call for its
enactment... :1 As to the latter (jurisdiction), the Supreme Court, in
1970]
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matters. In administrative proceedings the Justices have gone
so far as to create a "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" fact
doctrine whereby they grant de novo reviews, during which the
court examines evidentiary facts and makes its own findings of
fact.79 So, too, has the federal judiciary, acting of its own
volition, gone into the facts in federal criminal"0 and civil 8'
matters, as well as in administrative proceedings.8 2 Thus, unless
it is held that the Congressional power to declare war is un-
limited, unconditioned, and uncontrolled,83 the judicial branch
must somehow provide a factual rein to prevent this constitu-
tionally delegated power from being abused. If the Supreme
Court may examine the President's exercise of power via an
executive order, then it should be able to do the same for a
legislative exercise of power via a statute-whether this power
is exercised to control the national economy in peace or in war,
revamping the civil law requirements for constitutional (non-personal) service
of process, went deeply into the facts to show "presence" within a state suf-
ficient to permit jurisdiction to attach. See International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957) ; and discussion in FoRKoSCH, CONsTrUTONAL 451-54 (1963), and
CARMODY-FoRioSCH Naw YoRx PRAcTIcE, Chaps. VIII-X (8th ed. 1963, and
1968-1969 suppl.).
79. The most outstanding situation, where a constitutional infringement is
claimed based upon the facts, is Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920), a rate-making case which has been severely
criticized and somewhat limited procedurally but not substantively as to the
exercise of such power, on which see FORxOscH, ADMINISRATIVE §§ 342-3;
DAVIS, ADMINISTRA'nII, supra note 67, IV, §§ 29.08.10; and L. JATEE, JUDI-
CIAL CONTROL OF ADmINISmTRTIVE Acriox 652-53 (1965), all giving other
cases. See also note 82 infra.
80. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).; and other (unreasonable) search and seizure cases in which probable
cause is a factual question. See FoRxoscH, CONSTITUr ONAL § 424. See also
United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (a
commerce question involving facts).
81. The Supreme Court even went behind a prima facie valid judgment,
where a state attempted to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction, to ascertain
the true facts so as to disclose that it, the High Court, did not have jurisdic-
tion. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888). Although for states
see Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
82. "Jurisdiction in the executive to order deportation exists only if
the person arrested is an alien. The claim of citizenship is thus a
denial of an essential jurisdictional fact. The situation bears some
resemblance to that which arises where one against whom pro-
ceedings are being taken under the military law denies that he is in
the military service. It is well settled that in such a case a writ of
habeas corpus will issue to determine the status." Brandeis, in Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
See also texts cited in note 79 supra. Even in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 320 U.S. 591, 60 (1944), a rate-making case, as in Ohio Valley Water
Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920), the Court went into an
extended discussion of the evidence although saying that the "end product!' (at
601) or "end result" (at 603) controlled.
83. But see, notes 41, 44, 46, and 48 supra.
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or to declare war. And is not the only way to do this to go into
the facts?
What are the "facts" which apply here? They embrace both
Presidential and Congressional ones, as well as findings of fact
and evidentiary ones. President Johnson's initial belief that
as the Chief Executive, he could, alone and without more,
engage our armed forces in Vietnam, was misplaced and weak.
It was sufficiently weak, as he himself recognized, to warrant
a request of Congress for its cooperation. 4 The Tonkin Gulf
:Resolution"8 of August 10, 1964, resulted."8 As it is the only
Congressional basis for authority to the President, not only to
wage his Vietnam action but also to conscript through the con-
gressional statutes in this area, this resolution requires a detailed
and extensive analysis and evaluation.
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution contains three introductory
"Whereas" clauses, followed by two relevant sections8s Each
clause and section must be examined. The first clause states,
84. Analogically, but not similarly, to the Lincoln situation, notes 26, 28,
and 31 supra. See also the Roosevelt request of Congress for legislation in
1942 but threatening, if it were not given, to "accept the responsibility, and I
will [nevertheless] act," although concluding that "When the war is won, the
powers under which I act automatically revert to the people-to whom they
belong." Quoted in FoaioscH, CONSTITUTIONAL. 161. For another analysis see
Malawer, The Vietnam War Under the Constitution: Legal Issues Involved
In the United States Military Involvement in Vietnam, 31 U. OF Prrrs. L.
Rxv. 205 (1969).
85. The Resolution itself nowhere carries this designation, and Tonkin Gulf
is not once referred to. The basis for this characterization is in the back-
ground of the first Whereas clause, next discussed, infra note 88, and text
keyed thereto, which refers to the alleged attack by three North Vietnamese
torpedo boats upon the American destroyer Maddox on August 2, 1964. The
Administration's details are to be found in the statement by Adlai E. Steven-
son, the U.S. Representative in the Security Council on August 5, 1964, Dept.
of State Bull., Aug. 24, 1964, pp. 272-74.
86. HJ. Res. 1145, P.L 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964). The trenchant paper
by WORmUTH, VrNAm, supra note 5, effectively demolishes the contentions
of the State Department that the President had such powers without the
Resolution, and shows that even with the Resolution the alleged "war" in
Vietnam was unconstitutionally entered into.
The deviousness with which the military and the executive branch have
managed to commit the power and personnel of the United States abroad is
displayed in hearings before a Senate subcommittee on American security
commitments abroad, detailed somewhat by Tom Wicker in his N.Y. Times,
Nov. 25, 1969, at 46, col. 3.
87. A third and final section is unimportant, merely stating the Resolution
is to expire when the President so determines, or earlier by another concur-
rent resolution of Congress. To the contention that Congress has reserved to
itself this power, and therefore the Court should not interfere, especially as a
political act of high national importance is involved, the short answer is that
it is not a question of congressional discretion when or how to act which is
here examined but whether Congress ever had any power to enter into such an
arrangement with the President or to conscript, or to continue conscripting,
or to prevent a registrant from utilizing counsel in the conscripting process.
1970]
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as a finding of fact, that North Vietnamese "naval units ...
have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval
vessels," a fact brought into disrepute by the effective and well-
publicized Senate hearings and investigations.88 As this overall
analysis of the Resolution discloses, this so-called fact is the only
finding in the entire document. Upon its truth, it is suggested,
hinges the ability of the Congress and the President to act or to
continue to act. This writer has attempted to disclose in the
half dozen paragraphs preceding this one that facts are the
basis for the exercise of various and different powers in various
and different situations, and the cases disclose a judicial readi-
ness to inquire into and for them, regardless of any upholding or
denouncing of the power exercised.
For example, in Hirabayasi 89 the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor resulted in a series of Executive Orders beginning on
88. See, the memorandum of law prepared by the Lawyers Committee on
American Policy Toward Vietnam in 1967 (reproduced Cong. Rec. of Sept.
23, 1965), and their reply, Vietnam and International War (1967) to the
State Department's second memorandum "The Legality of United States
Participation in the Defense of Vietnam," U.S. State Dept. Bull. Vol. 54,
#1396 (1966). See also PUSEY, WAY, supra, note 5, who effectively disposes
of this inflation of a trivial naval incident into a major crisis. See also the
analysis by WOUTUTH, ViErTNAM, supra note 5, at 43-44. THE VIurNAM WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (R. Falk, ed., 1969) and brings together in two
volumes discussions by writers such as Dean Rusk and U Thant, on the war's
legality.
The Johnson Administration cavalierly interpreted the Tonkin Gulf Reso-
lution as "the functional equivalent of a declaration of war," but the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee has, in April of 1970, voted unanimously to
repeal it. The Nixon Administration contends that "its actions in Southeast
Asia are not based on the authority of the resolution" but repeal will, never-
theless, have a sobering effect on the President and also restore to the Con-
gress its constitutional responsibilities. See editorial, N.Y. Times, April 15,
1970, at 42, col. 1, and also Senate's vote, by 63 to 14, calling on the Presi-
dent to make no final agreement to return Okinawa to Japan without first
obtaining its advice and consent (which resolution is questionably binding on
the President constitutionally, although politically it is important). See also,
note 1 supra and note 105 infra.
Reference may also be made to the National Commitments Resolution
which passed the Senate by 70 to 16 in June, 1969, stating that "a national
commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken
by the legislative and executive branches of the United States Government bymeans of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both houses of Con-gress specifically providing for such commitment" See also JAWrrS, COlVGanss,
infra note 105, at 233. On December 15, 1969, by a 78-11 vote, the Senate
amended a defense appropriations bill so as to prohibit the commitment of
ground combat troops in Laos, etc. Cf. however, the House's vote by 333 to
55 on December 2, 1969, approving an Administration-supported resolution
endorsing the President's efforts to negotiate a "just peace" in Vietnam, which
was felt to be sufficiently ambiguous so as to be interpreted as supporting the
war (power) generally. For text, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
89. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). The majority opinion
by Stone was followed by three concurring ones by Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge.
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February 19,1942, authorizing the west coast military commander
to impose curfews and to relocate all persons of Japanese
ancestry. By legislation of March 21, 1942, Congress "ratified
and confirmed" (308 U.S. at 85) the orders and military actions.
"The actions taken must be appraised in the light of the condi-
tions with which the President and Congress were confronted in
the early months of 1942, many of which, since disclosed, were
then peculiarly within the knowledge of the military authorities"
(308 U.S. at 93-94). Included in these facts, which the Court
related in detail, were not only the Pacific battles and situations
but also the "threatened air raids and invasion [of the west
coast] by the Japanese forces," and the "safeguarding [of] the
military area ... from the danger of sabotage and espionage"
(308 U.S. at 95). The Court then went into a further statement
of facts to show that sabotage and espionage from Americans of
Japanese ancestry were not unthinkable9" that there was a
"reasonable ground for believing that the threat is real" (308
U.S. at 95), that "we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of
the military authorities and of Congress . . . for believing that
in a critical hour such persons ... constituted a menace to the
national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and
adequate measures be taken to guard against it," for "[t]he extent
of that danger could be definitely known only after the event and
after it was too late to meet it."' 1
Even though the Court upheld all these acts and statutes it
did go behind them to look at the true facts, and concluded that
"[tjhe threat of Japanese invasion of the west coast was not
fanciful but real" (308 U.S. at 105, Douglas) and that in view
"of the critical military situation which prevailed and the
urgent necessity of taking prompt and effective action" (308
U.S. at 112) action "taken by the military commander... was
taken in complete good faith and in the firm conviction that it
was "absolutely required" (308 U.S. at 109, Murphy). Although,
as Rutledge commented, "once it is found that an emergency has
created the conditions requiring or justifying the" conduct and
while he would not ordinarily proceed further, still "there may
90. "These are only some of the many considerations which those charged
with the responsibility for the national defense could take into account in
determining the nature and extent of the danger of espionage and sabotage, in
the event of invasion or an air raid attack." Id. at 99.
91. Id. Warren has suggested that these cases indicate the Court was in no
position to challenge or reject the President's conclusion of military necessity
during this wartime emergency. "The Bill of Rights and the Military," in
THE GPEAT RIGHTS 89, 101 (E. Calm. ed., 1963).
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... be bounds beyond which he cannot go and, if he oversteps
them, ... the courts ... have power to protect the civilian
citizen."92
This same judicial detailed examination of facts was also
found in the peacetime Steel Seizure Case but there, because the
emergency was on a different level and of a different nature,
the desired exercise of Presidential power was rejected.93 But,
assuming the existence of the facts when acted upon, can these
facts be re-examined, with a new determination? In a peacetime
mortgage situation this has occurred, as has been shown, 94 and
in his Endo concurrence Murphy felt that while "the military
orders excluding her from California were invalid at the time
they were issued, they are increasingly objectionable at this late
date, when the threat of invasion of the Pacific Coast and the
fears of sabotage and espionage have greatly diminished." 95 So,
too, are the courts examining into and behind the facts in civil
and criminal cases, as well as in administrative proceedings, and
there is no hint of any judicial usurpation of power in this, or
that it is not required of the Justices. Oar concept of the rule of
law is not a Platonic one; rather, it is the Aristotelian with a
modern passion for facts, with law creeping out from their
intersices,9 6 which governs our conduct within and without the
courts. And if all this be so, and the only finding of fact in
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution is the critical one of the alleged naval
attack, then the power of Congress so to resolve in 1964 (or to
delegate) is highly questionable. And even if Congress believed
these facts to be correct at the time and so acted properly at that
moment, later disclosures may invalidate the original fact and
the original or continued exercise of power or, conversely, uphold
the original exercise of power as in Hirabayashi. The Supreme
Court has power now to inquire into the original and claimed
true facts, decide as these now indicate, with power today to
determine that the continuing jurisdiction cease.
92. Id. at 114. I have omitted negatives, for Rutledge phrased this as a
question which "need not be faced" now. In Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), Black's majority opinion likewise referred to "an area
threatened by Japanese attack". Id. at 214.
93. The dissenters felt that because "[t]here is no judicial finding" of fact
that the President's action "was unwarranted," then the majority should not
reverse. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643 (1952).
Is not the implication that (1) if such a finding of fact were made (on a
substantial basis) then reversal would be permissible, and (2) that the major-
ity would be authorized (have power) to inquire into the evidence to ascertain
whether or not such a finding could be made?
94. Supra note 51.
95. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 308 (1944).
96. I have paraphrased H. MAxN', EAnLy LAw AND CuSTOMr 389 (1907).
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The second clause of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution asserts
"these attacks are part of a deliberate and- systematic campaign
of aggression" by Hanoi against its neighbors and allies. This
may well be, but one might ask: has not the United States since
receded from this diplomatic and policy position? Has it not
discarded the domino theory, as well as the puppet one (Hanoi
is fronting for China and/or Russia) ? And is it not willing
today to have the North Vietnamese take over the entire country,
if, and provided that, free and democratic elections are held.
97
This, in effect, means that either the view expressed in the
second clause is not a finding of fact but simply an opinion, or
else that the facts have changed.98
The third clause is only self-serving, hortatory, or innocuous,
merely stating that we have no territorial ambitions in southeast
Asia and desire "only that these peoples should be left in peace
to work out their own destinies in their own way... " a
statement which is immaterial for our discussion. The three
clauses, therefore, either were incorrect factually when promul-
gated or else have been rejected or altered by time and the tides
of political opinion.99 In any event, they certainly do not repre-
sent the findings of fact, or the evidentiary ones, which today
would be made if a similar resolution were requested.
The first section of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution iterates con-
gressional approval and support of the President's determination
"to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United
States to prevent further aggression." The former item can
refer only to what allegedly occurred at Tonkin Gulf, this being
"further aggression" in the latter item, and therefore, is ques-
tionable as being of any support to the first clause as a fact; the
latter is not any fact in the past (although "further" implies the
past) but merely for the future, later aggression, if any occurs.
The second, and here important, section contains two sentences,
the first being merely a statement of our feeling that "peace
and security in southeast Asia" are "vital to [our] national
interest and to world peace. . . ." This probably might well
97. WORMuUTH, ViErNAm, mipra note 5 at 16, quotes Senator Fulbrights
complaint that the policy "has been radically changed since the summer of
1964." THnE ARRoGANCE OF PoWER 51 (1966). Since 1966 the policy has con-
tinued to be so changed until today there has been a large degree of reversal.
98. See note 88 stpra. See also note 57 supra.
99. Even during the actual war period the Supreme Court felt that it had
erred in policy, and therefore reversed its flag salute holding, Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); rev/d. in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also note 57 mipra.
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have been incorporated in the third Whereas clause, but regard-
less, is a declaratory statement of a view held in 1964, and as
above mentioned, refers to the discarded domino theory which the
next sentence somewhat explicates. The next statement is
"Consonant with the Constitution of the United States [and
United Nations Charter and Southeast Asian Treaty obligations],
the United States, is therefore, prepared as the President de-
termines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed
force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense
of its freedom." These quoted words in effect give the President
a blank check ("all necessary steps, including the use of armed
force") whenever he so feels ("determines") in order to aid
Vietnam ("assist any member or protocol state .. .requesting
assistance") .100
There is, however, a major limitation upon this delegation
of Congressional power. For it is now the President, not Con-
gress, who has the power to institute or make, if not declare,
war.101 A second major objection is the lack of any standard
100. On "war by invitation," and its unconstitutionality, see WoR.MuTH,
VIETNAM, supra note 5, at 21-28.
101. Id. at 44, who argues against such a power to delegate, quoting from
Justice Marshall's opinion in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1
(1825), that a "strictly and exclusively legislative" congressional power can-
not be delegated "to the courts, or to any other tribunals . . . ." This general
statement has, of course, been rejected by modern-day necessities of delegating
such powers to administrative tribunals, merely softening the power by term-
ing it a "quasi" one (Holmes, J.,) dissenting in Springer v. Phillipine Islands,
277 U.S. 189, 210 (1928). See FORKOScH, ADmINISTRATivE, 48. See also note
69 supra. The point made by Professor Wormuth is nevertheless valid in cer-
tain peacetime situations, e.g., "The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or
to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus
vested," Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935),
and especially in this alleged war (or emergency) situation does this prohibi-
tion hold, as:
(1) this is an express grant of power of an "essential legislative function"
by art. I, § 8, cl. 11 to Congress, and therefore limited to that body. Hamilton
espoused this view in opposition to Jefferson's dispatch of a squadron of
frigates (for defensive purposes only) to the Mediterranean after the Bay of
Tripoli had declared war on us in 1801 (which raises the question, can a
mosquito so antagonize the elephant that, without more, the latter may now
trample upon him, i.e., entire villages and the nation to overcome it?) ; Ham-
ilton felt that "[i]t is the peculiar and exclusive province of Congress, when
the nation is at peace to change that state into a state of war .. . ." (7
Works 746-47 [1851]). See also Daniel Webster's views in 1814, as quoted by
Douglas, dissenting in Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 939 n.3 (1968),
and Webster's statement in 1847 concerning the Mexican War: "I hold the
war-making power to be instrusted to Congress. The Constitution places it
there. I believe that Congress was surprised into the recognition of war on
the 13th of May, 1846. I believe that if the question had been put to Congress
before the advance march of our troops, not ten votes could have been ob-
tained to pronounce that there was then an existing state of things which
[Vol. 22
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whatever to guide the President-delegatee in using his uncon-
trolled discretion in so determining, or in what is meant by
"necessary steps," or what the limits are in "the use of armed
force." The word "determines" may conceivably be limited by
the implied common law term "reasonable", i.e., as the President
reasonably determines, but if so, this almost certainly permits
judicial questioning of the facts upon which the reasonableness
is based. 0 2 The word "necessary" which superficially modifies
"steps" is likewise a term analogous to "reasonable," and the
language may even be inferentially held to be "all necessary and
reasonable steps"; in either case, the court again has power to
inquire into the necessity of a. particular step, under the facts
and circumstances then applying or continuing to apply.103 And
even if the clause "including armed force" is added to the
preceding, it is nevertheless embraced within "steps", not "neces-
sary," for the variety of steps to assist a nation includes mat6riel,
advice, etc., as well as men; which still leaves "necessary" open
to the preceding objection so that now the judiciary again has
power to inquire into the factual and situational necessity,
amounted to, or justified, war or to declare war against Mexico .... It
must be admitted to be the clear intent of the Constitution, that no foreign
war should exist without the assent of Congress. This was meant as a re-
straint on the executive power." Id.
(2) Apparently the Supreme Court has agreed with Hamilton and Webster,
e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 DaUll.) 37 (1800), Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 1 (1801), Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). Wor-
muth concludes that only "Congress may initiate action short of general war,
that the initiation both of general war and of action short of general war
belongs to Congress, and that it is for Congress to prescribe the dimensions
of the war." Id. at 9.
102. See the Panama Refining case, supra note 68, where both Hughes, for
the majority, and Cardozo, the lone dissenter, concurred in the necessity of a"standard reasonably clear wherby discretion must be governed," at 434. See
also Douglas' dissent, in New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884
(1951), that "Absolute discretion, like corruption, marks the beginning of the
end of liberty." See further FoxoscH, ADmxiuisTrnan-r, 103-15. In rate-
making, of course, the courts go even beyond this requirement of standard and
will also review de novo, e.g., id. at 750-51, giving the Ben Avon situation,
supra note 79.
103. In American Power and Light Co., 329 U.S. 90, 91 (1946), the Court
upheld a delegation of power to simplify corporate structures or break up
companies in a holding company system when these "unduly or unnecessarily
complicate the structure, or unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power
... ." This peacetime delegation and exercise of power, all subject to (con-
tinning) judicial review, with a negative (as in the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's "unfair methods of competition") plus additional terms of limitation, is
a far cry from what is here examined in isolation, with liberty, not property,
involved. See Brandeis in the St. Joseph Stock Yards Case, infra note 117, at
77, stating that when a citizen claims his liberty is infringed he must be given
a "judicial determination of the facts" via habeas corpus, if necessary. "But a
multitude of decisions tells us that when dealing with property a much more
liberal rule applies."
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initially or today, for the use (or continued use) of armed force,
i.e., men may not be "necessary" even though machines are.
This lack of standard in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution is con-
firmed by reference to Section 4(a) of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967 which contains this delegation: "The
President is authorized, from time to time, whether or not a state
of war exists, to select and induct ... such number of persons
as may be required to provide and maintain the strength of the
Armed Forces. 104 Assuming Congressional ability so to act
in times of peace (which has been denied above), the delegation
itself permits the selecting and inducting power to be exercised
for the twin purpose of providing and maintaining the force's
strength. The power is the means whereby the purpose or end is
to be accomplished, and neither of these, means or end, is quali-
fied in any way. The clause "as may be required" vests discretion
ir the President, and here, too, there is no limitation upon his
unbridled exercise, e.g., he may decide ten million inductees are
required to maintain such strength. Again, as with the Resolu-
tion, whether or not "reasonably" is placed before "required,"
the judiciary must determine either factual situation, else "dele-
gation running riot" ensues. Similarly if the same term is used
to qualify "number of persons", or "provide", or "maintain", or
"strength", the same conclusion follows.
The unbridled and uncontrolled delegation in Section 4(a)
can be justified only in terms of an actual war situation or grave
and acute national emergency, and then only temporarily, °5
but in 1967 there was neither, and as of this writing this con-
tinues to be the case. Even the statutes concerning active duty
refer to a "time of war or of national emergency declared by
Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law," before permit-
ting reserve units generally, without their consent, to be called
to active duty, ° 6 or similarly "[i]n time of national emergency
104. Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100, 50 U.S.C. § 454(a).
105. See Roosevelt's promise, supra note 84, and also notes 1 and 88. On
October 14, 1969, Senators Javits and Pell introduced a resolution to termi-
nate the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on December 13, 1970, which would not
however, repeal current Congressional authorization for continued aid, train-
ing, and equipment to Vietnam, Laos, and elsewhere. On December 8, 1969,
Senator Mathias introduced a resolution to terminate not only the Tonkin one
but also the Quemoy-Matsu-Formosa one of 1955, the Mideast one of 1957,
and the Cuban one of 1962. See also Javits, Tlhe Congressional Presence i,
Foreign Relations, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 221 (1970), and cf. Shaplen, Our
Involvemcnt hp Laos, id., at 478.
106. 10 U.S.C. § 672(a), permitting the order to be by "an authority desig-
nated by the Secretary concerned .... " And for a like statute for the stand-
by reserve, see § 674(a).
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declared by the President" for the ready reserve.10 7 In other
words, these reserves are treated differently (unequally, to
discriminate against the registrant-inductee?) in that active
duty requires, as a condition precedent, war or a Congressional
(Presidential) declaration of a national (not just an ordinary)
emergency, whereas the registrant may eventually be inducted
"whether or not a state of war exists," without any national
emergency being declared or existing in fact, and solely in the
discretion of the Presidential-delegatee.
The limitations to the Tonkin blank check are both external
and internal. Is there any finding of fact upon which the
congressional (and then Presidential war power may constitu-
tionally be exercised, e.g., has a foreign nation attacked us, or
declared war on us? If not, then has Congress any power under
Article I, section 8, clause 2 to declare war against a foreign
body, if we do not desire to dignify North Vietnam as a nation?
Or, if we accept the statement of opinion, not facts, in the first
sentence of section 2, that our national interest requires peace
and security in Vietnam, is this per se, or even in conjunction
with the alleged attack, sufficient as a justification for the
exercise of any such congressional (war) power? Even if the
second sentence is to be upheld because of our treaty commit-
ments, it opens with "Consonant with the Constitution," and the
Supreme Court has already indicated that a treaty cannot violate
a constitutional requirement. 08 Or, if this objection is not
sufficient, then "all necessary steps, including the use of armed
force," may also be a limitation, for by specifying the latter as
one such necessary step the Congress placed it in a category
separate and different from others, e.g., advisors, weapons,
money. In effect, and to avoid ambiguity and confusion, Con-
gress here recognized that "all necessary steps" might ordinarily
be judicially interpreted as not including "armed force" because
of constitutional limitations, and therefore strove to indicate its
desires.
This congressional action reinforces the view here expounded:
that such an additional power delegated to the President must
find constitutional support in the actuality or declaration of
war-for while there is peace "no doctrine that the Court could
promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming than
107. Id. at § 673(a), with the same general language as above.
108. See Forkosch, Treaties atzd Executive Agreements, 32 CHICAGo-KENT
L. REv. 201, 209-10 (1954), for citations and references, and also WoPtTrr,
VETNAM, supra note 5, at 40.
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that [the Congress] can vastly enlarge [its] mastery over the
internal affairs of the country by [its] own [or with the Presi-
dent's]P0 9 commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some
foreign venture."" 0 This view discounts the power of Congress
itself to "raise" armies in time of peace (apparently still the
government's contention),"" and further indicates that a "for-
eign venture""12 is without the power of either branch or both
unless some valid support 8 is shown; in the President's case,
Congressional, and in Congress's case, constitutional. Further,
and aiguendo, if the Tonkin Gulf Resolution's "armed forces" is
nevertheless upheld, and the President thereby claims the power
to send men to Vietnam which is also upheld, he possibly can
so dispatch regular army men and volunteers, but this does not
necessarily mean that conscripts may be so treated or raised. Can-
not a draftee or inductee claim this Vietnam combat service is
without the power of the two branches even while conceding the
power to raise and require service of some other kind?
I. A REGISTRANTS ACTUAL RIGHTs v. TnE CoNscnRIPrio PowRR
This 1964 and continued exercise of congressional-executive
power in conscripting men for the Vietnam "venture" was and/
or is without the general power of either, whether under the
Constitution or a delegation-at least this seems to be now
indicated. Even if an emergency claim is added, the facts as
they existed in 1964 disprove that theory, and do so even more
clearly today. This, in effect, requires the war-time (or extreme
109. In the Hirabayashi case, stpra note 57, at 912 Stone referred to such
a coupling of powers so that both branches, acting together, were there upheld
in imposing "the curfew restriction here complained of", and also delegating
to a "designated military commander" power to determine whether, when, and
where so to impose. Murphy also referred to this "working toegether" but
added "in normal times," at 109. See also notes 57 and 113.
110. See note 47 supra, for the exact quotation (here slightly altered).
111. See note 44 supra.
112. The term "venture" as used by Jackson, supra note 47, there referred to
the Korean situation, now comparable and analogous to the one in Vietnam,
i.c., actual fightings. Therefore, the valid dispatching of troops to Germany
for occupation purposes cannot be used for any counter-argument nor, if one
points to Japan (with which a peace treaty was signed), for a like dispatch,
for we have stationed troops at overseas bases for decades, e.g., Guantanamo,
Pearl Harbor (prior to Hawaii's statehood). While this may be foreign
"service," it is not a "venture" as above used and we limit this discussion to
"venture." Cf. however, a statement illustrative of the feeling and views of the
combatants, that "I don't know I agree that this war is different from any
other war," was made by a military judge of a general court-martial in South
Vietnam. New York Times, March 20, 1970, at 16, col. 4.
113. In Hirabayashi, supra note 57, there was an actual war, with a valid
belief in an immediate and threatened Japanese invasion of the west coast,
whereas here these facts are farthest from the situation, i.e., it is the United
States which is sending combat troops to foreign shores.
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emergency) measure of conscription now to be denounced, so that
no question of a constitutional right to counsel within the Selec-
tive Service System need arise. Arguendo, the power to conscript
may be sustained, whether generally (i.e., even during peace) or
particularly (i.e., an acute and overriding emergency)-does this
carry with it the further power to deny a registrant his sixth
amendment right to counsel in and during the System's pro-
ceedings? Or, aside from a sixth amendment right, through the
fifth's due process requirements?
There are two main objections to the denial of such a right
today. First, in any administrative 1 4 proceeding a respondent
has a constitutional right to a full and fair hearing which in-
cludes counsel whenever a quasi-judicial power is being exercised
and judicial review is circumscribed as to the merits, with excep-
tions being permitted in but a few situations.11 Secondly, even
during such latter situations, one's constitutional rights at least
as to counsel cannot be denied except and unless the conditions
are so grave that "national survival is at stake . . .-."
A. Registrant's Right to a Full and Fair Hearing
The law surrounding a registrant's claim to counsel within
the Selective Service System does not embrace a governmental
114. There can be no denial that local boards act administratively, for the
exhaustion doctrine is applied. DuVernay v. United States, 394 F2d 979, 981
(5th Cir. 1968), aff'd. equally divided court, 394 U.S. 309, as is the minor
prejudice doctrine. See cases in notes 133, 149, 191 infra.
115. For example, the hearing may, under emergency conditions or for like
reasons, be postponed, as in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), or
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), and in summary destruction (bad
food) cases this is commonplace. See, North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chi-
cago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). This question whether a registrant's "hearing" can
be postponed within the local board until after the initial classification, is not
required to be answered, so long as a hearing, with the right to counsel, is
given prior to the classification becoming final. See Opp Cotton Mills v.
Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941). See also United States v. Illinois
Central RRL., 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393
(1934). Nevertheless, a hearing may, in an emergency situation, be denied,
where adequate judicial review is substituted. Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis,
241 U.S. 440 (1916). The Court in Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503
(1944) quoted Brandeis in Phillips v. Comm'r. 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931) that
"where only property rights are involved, mere postponement" is proper "if
the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is
adequate'. See also note 167 infra. However, (1) personal constitutional rights
are involved here; (2) there is no present emergency; (3) constitutional, not
statutory, rights are involved; (4) a statute here expressly requires the hear-
ing, just the contrary of that in Bowles, Yakius, and other analogous cases.
116. Douglas, concurring in Hirabayashi, supra note 57, at 106. In Illinois
v. Alien, 90 S.Ct. 435 (1970), the Court refused to accept the intermediate
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gratuity, pension, grant, gift, or like situation wherein "no vested
right" is created. 117 In such nonconstitutional fields there is or-
dinarily no constitutional right (by definition) to a full"1 8 hear-
ing or to counsel.119 Here, the initial question involves what
field of law is actually present. There can be no disputing the
fact that one's liberty, at the very least, is being "taken" when one
is inducted involuntarily, so that at least a fifth amendment
right to due process of law is present,'120 that is notice and hear-
ing121 at some point before the taking becomes final. But even if
there is such a requirement, there is ordinarily no additional
constitutional need to have the full hearing in the agency pro-
tribunal's view that a defendant's "right to be present at his own trial was so
'absolute' that, no matter how unruly or disruptive" he was he could never
lose it so long as he insisted upon it. Instead, such a defendant "can lose his
right to be present" but it can "be reclaimed as soon as" he is willing to
behave (on question of whether Allen was competent, see concurrence by
Douglas). Quaere: can one's right to counsel (of his own choosing or else
court-appointed) be likewise so treated under these disruptive circumstances?
And even if not, where the lawyer likewise so acts, can one's own chosen (and
paid for) counsel be so removed and a defendant left bereft of advice save
from one he does not desire?
117. Brandeis, in Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934) held a
contract of insurance did not create a vested interest See also United States
v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 (1919), that "the United States, when it creates
rights in individuals against itself, is under no obligation to provide a remedy
through the courts," cited by the Justice in his dissent in St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 77 (1936), for the statement that
"[w]hen dealing with constitutional rights (as distinguished from privileges
accorded by the Government [Babcock])". However, in Wheeler v. Mont-
gomery, 296 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal. 1968) and Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp.
893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), juris. noted sub. iwn. Goldberg v. Kelley, 394 U.S. 971,
(1969), the two consolidated appeals to the Supreme Court from conflicting
three-judge District Court rulings respectively dismissing and refusing to dis-
miss claims of constitutional rights in state welfare practices, resulted in 503
holdings that local officials could not constitutionally cancel welfare benefits
to clients without first granting them hearings. Goldberg v. Kelly, 90 S.Ct.1011 (1970). "ul
'118. A statute giving a "full" hearing is interpreted to mean a hearing of
a quasi-judicial nature, in which the constitutional minimums of procedural
due process require adequate notice and a fair hearing, e.g., the right to coun-
sel in agency proceedings, Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
119. See discussion in FORKOSCH, ADMINISTRATIVF 54-60, giving cases and
references. Of course a statute may grant this right, but this is not considered
here.
120. However, art. I, § 9, cl. 2 prevents "The privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus" from being suspended by the federal government, which also
implies, especially in view of the exceptions attached, a right to be free from
detention, etc.
121. "That no man is to be judged unheard was a precept known to the
Greeks, inscribed in ancient times upon images in places where justice was
administered, proclaimed in Seneca's Medea, enshrined in the scriptures, men-
tioned by St. Augustine, embodied in Germanic and other proverbs, ascribed
in the Year Books to the law of nature, asserted by Coke to be a principle of
divine justice, and traced by an eighteenth-century judge to the events in the
Garden of Eden." S. DESZmTH, JUDICrAL RNv'nw oF AD mmIsm.ATIvE ACTION
102 (1959).
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ceeding when it is performing solely legislative 2 2 or executive 2 8
functions, 2 4 or the proceeding is non-adversary in nature. 2i
The second question is therefore: what power is being exer-
cised by a local board, or any internal reviewing board exercis-
ing these same powers, when a registrant appears before it, and
what is the nature of the proceeding. This question cannot be
answered generally. Each type of appearance requires a detailed
examination to ascertain exactly what is actually being done by
the board with and to the registrant at the particular moment
involved. Each situation cannot be discussed, but an illustrative
one, necessarily covering all registrants, may be examined,
namely, classification. The particular statutes and regulations
involved and applicable must first be set forth as a backdrop.
The Military Selective Service Act of 1967 provides in section
3 that every male citizen of, and other male person in, the United
States, between the ages of 18 and 26, must register pursuant
to Presidential proclamation and by rules and regulations to be
prescribed. 1 26 Section 5[a] provides that the selection for train-
ing and service is to be made from among these registrants
pursuant to rules and regulations with certain provisos at-
taching. Section 6 says that exemptions and deferments are
provided for, and in section 10[a][1] there is "established in
the executive branch of the Government an agency to be known
122. For example, solely rate-making as such for the future, although by
statute a combined quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial combination is generally
exercised, e.g., Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S.
370 (1932).
123. For example, a deportation "proceeding is, throughout, executive in its
nature." Brandeis, in Ng Fung Ho v. White, supra note 82, at 284.
124. Assuming, of course, no statute requires it, as in note 122 supra. See
also notes 118-19.
125. See United States v. Abilene & Southern R.R., 265 U.S. 274 (1924),
and note 117 supra.
126. Under § 10(b) (1) the President is authorized to prescribe rules and
regulations, and under § 10(c)1 to delegate or permit subdelegation of "any
authority vested in him under this title.. . ." The delegation of the power to
prescribe and promulgate rules and regulations to the director is valid, Savor-
etti v. Small, 244 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1957). See also the Selective Service
Regulations Part 1611, concerning the details, exemptions, etc. These statutes
and their regulations may have induced former Selective Service Director
Hershey to feel that "a registrant is not an ordinary citizen," N.Y. Times,
Oct. 31, 1969 at 4, col. 1, but fortunately, he was not supported in this by the
judiciary, (e.g., in Toussie v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 858 (1970), the five-year
statute of limitations (18 U.S.C. § 3282) was held applicable as of the date of
his failure to register at 18, and did not, as the government contended, apply
to each day thereafter that he continued so to fail to do).
On the arguments against the randomness of the new "random selection
sequence" draft lottery instituted under an Executive Order of Nov. 26, 1969,
see N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1970 at 66, col. 3.
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as the Selective Service System, and a Director .... " The Presi-
dent is authorized
to create and establish within the Selective Service
System civilian local boards, civilian appeal boards,
and such other civilian agencies, including agencies of
appeal, as may be necessary to carry out its functions
with respect to the registration, examination, classifica-
tion, selection... of persons .... Such local boards127
... shall, under rules and regulations prescribed by the
President, have the power . . . to hear and determine
... all questions or claims with respect to inclusion for,
or exemption or deferment from, training and service
under this title, of all individuals within the jurisdic-
tion of such local boards. The decisions of such local
board shall be final, except where an appeal is author-
ized and is taken in accordance with such rules and
regulations as the President may prescribe . . . . No
judicial review shall be made of the classification or
processing of any registrant by local boards, appeal
boards, or the President, except as a defense to a crim-
inal prosecution ... [and] such review shall go to the
question of jurisdiction herein reserved to local boards
... only when there is no basis in fact for the classifi-
cation assigned to such registrant .... (§ 10[1>][31).
The Selective Service Regulations contain details 28 on all
of the preceding and include the following: the local board
chairman is to "take necessary action to prepare for registration"
127. The Selective Service Regulations give details as to the composition of
such boards and, here of interest, do not permit a member to act where the
registrant involved is a first cousin or closer, either by blood, marriage, or
adoption, or where the registrant is an employee or employer, etc., Part
1604.55.
128. See generally 32 C.F.R. XVI. See note 126 supra, on delegation by the
President. These promulgated rules and regulations are a registrant's right to
be accorded to him. Knox v. United States, 200 F2d 398 (9th Cir. 1952);
Forkosch, DRarr CARD BURNING, supra note 41, at 308 n.22, and 322 n.73, and
note 160 infra, as well as Ginger, Minimunm Due Process Standards in Selec-
ive Service Cases, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1313 (1968). An excellent descriptive
article of the system's functionings applied to registrants, and suggesting that
because of the penalties inflicted if forms are not properly and fully com-
pleted, etc., "a critical stage [as] in the criminal proceedings" has been
reached, and that the warnings (see FoaxoscH, CONSTIUTIONAL LAW § 430
[2d ed. 1969]) required in criminal matters should be required and given here
(at 1341). See also Comment, Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective
Service System, 114 U. PA. L. Rsv. 1014, 1029-34 (1966) re the right to ad-
visors or counsel, and advocating the presence of counsel at local board hear-
ings even though speaking (arguing) would be discretionary with the board.
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and is to "supervise" it when and as required (Pt. 1612.21) ;129
each registrant is assigned a selective service number (Pt. 1621.2),
and a file or "Cover Sheet (SSS Form 101)" is opened for him
(Pt. 1621.8); a questionnaire (Form 100) is then mailed (Pt.
1621.9) which the registrant must complete and return within
ten days (Pt. 1621.10). 130 This questionnaire is an eight-page
document, five of which have thirteen subdivisions which require
the registrant to give detailed information as follows; identifi-
cation, military record; marital status and dependents; regis-
trant's family; occupation; agricultural occupation, minister or
student preparing for the ministry, conscientious objector, edu-
cation; statement of alien, physical condition; court record, sole
surviving son.131 Assuming no problem arises as to the pro-
cedures and completion of the questionnaire,'13 2 classification
later occurs. "Classification is the key to selection" and it is
"the local board's responsibility to decide . . . ." (Pt. 1622.1
[b][c]). A majority of those present at a local board (Pt.
1604.56) or a panel (Pt. 1604.52a[d]) meeting "shall decide any
question or classification.' 33 A local board member is to "ad-
129. The procedures at Pt. 1613.11 et seq. include authority to the registrar
to obtain the "information necessary" and "sufficient information" for the
registration, and he is to "note ...which [of the registrant's answers] he
believes to be incorrect or false" or else to indicate otherwise with a "None"
(1613.14[a]). To what extent this power in the registrar is properly dele-
gated, and, second whether it can be properly exercised, and third, whether
this does not bring him into the selection process directly, or indirectly, are
questions not explored. On this last aspect, however, questions of propriety,
at the least, enter.
130. For further details see Forkosch, Draft Card Burning, vupra note 41,
at 303-05 and also SSLR PRAcTicE MANUAL § 1010, at 1034, and 2076 et seq.
131. There is an additional 14th subdivision, with blank lines, headed "State-
ment of Registrant" which permits amplification of the preceding. In addition,
any and all other and additional information may be supplied via affidavits,
etc.
132. There are other provisions concerning the obtaining and using of all
other information, but nothing is to be considered, even oral information,
unless summarized in writing and placed in the registrant's file. "Under no
circumstances shall the local board rely upon information received by a mem-
ber personally unless" then put an paper and filed. Pt. 1623.1(b).
133. Ordinarily "no panel ... shall determine any question or classifica-
tion" save the one to which the registrant is initially assigned. Pt. 1604.52a(e).
In such classifying of a registrant "[tlhere shall be no discrimination for or
against him because of" race, creed, color, memberships or activities in labor,
political, religious, etc. organizations, and "Ee]ach such registrant shall receive
equal justice." Pt. 1622.1(d).
It may be noted that any re-classifications (or other forms of reprisals)
because of political activity run afoul of not only general principles of justice
and American constitutional law, but also of the System's own regulations,
which is condemned when any other agency so acts. Breen v. Selective Service
Local Board No. 16, 90 S. Ct. 661 (1970), where a student exemption, not
deferment, was involved, and Kolden, v. Selective Service Board, 90 S. Ct. 811
(1970). This case granted certiorari in five other cases, and remanded all for
reconsideration in the light of Breen; see further Gutknecht v. United States,
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minister the following oath to every person testifying before"
it. 134 Minutes are to be kept of each meeting (Pt. 1604.56),
and a government appeal agent "shall be appointed by the
President" for each local board. His duties include, but are
not limited to, attendance at "such local board meetings as
the local board may request," and rendering "such assistance
to the local board as it may request by advising the members
and interpreting for them laws, regulations, and other direc-
tives.' 3   In theory this provision for board counsel is sup-
posedly balanced by another provision, that "advisors to
registrants may 30 be appointed by the Director . . . to advise
and assist registrants in the preparation of questionnaires . . .
90 S. Ct. 506 (1970) ; Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Board No. 11, 393
U.S. 233, 237-38 (1968); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 380 et seq. (1957) ;
Estep v. United States, supra note 7, at 121 et seq.; FoRKoscH, ADMINisraA-
TivW, 340-43; Forkosch, Draft Card Burning, supra note 41, at 327. See also
Breen and Oestereich, mpra, and Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968), per-
mitting pre-induction suits to restrain induction where a "clear departure by
the board from its statutory mandate," i.e., the exemption, was involved, but
the court denied such process where improper considerations were alleged to
motivate the board's decision on reclassification. For further cases and their
implications, see Sloan v. Local Bd. No. 1, 414 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1969).
See also Stiles v. United States, (1st Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 391 U.S. 903,
writ dismissed after argument as improvidently granted, 393 U.S. 219.
The regulations and requirements also seek to protect the registrant from
bias or prejudice by a member for or against him. On the necessity that an
examiner be free of bias see FoxoscHr, ADmINISTRATv, at 321-28. However,
see Gibson v. Reynolds, 172 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925
(1949), where it was held that a member of a board who had misclassified a
registrant could not be sued even though "possessed of animosity or even
malice toward one whom the officer may erroneously feel is seeking an
immunity to which he is not entitled." For example, in Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), Vinson in effect permitted a
tort action against an administrative official where the allegations in effect
alleged deliberate and wilful conduct which caused damage. But in Gregoire
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, (1950)
Learned Hand refused to permit such a personal suit for damages against a
United States Attorney-General, and also several agency directors, because of
policy grounds, and quoted an earlier opinion that a federal attorney, "if not
a judicial officer, is at least a quasi-judicial officer" and is therefore "im-
mune" absolutely.
134. Pt. 1604.57 (the oath being that generally found in courts): "You
swear (or affirm) that the evidence you give in the matter now in hearing
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you
God." It may be additionally noted that this oath uses the term "evidence."
435. Pt. 1604.71(a) and (d) (2a) (4), with subdivision (5) being: "To be
equally diligent in protecting the interests of the Government and the rights
of the registrants in all matters." On the problem of divided loyalties, conflict
in work and "representing", see SSLR PRAcricE MANUAL § 45, at 1025. But
see especially the type of cross-examination, etc. indulged in by the agent in
United States v. DeLime, 121 F. Supp. 750 (D.C.N.J. 1954), affd 223 F2d
96 (3d Cir. 1955). A board is disqualified to classify a registrant who is a
government appeal agent, or advisor to registrants, etc. Pt. 1604.55(b).
136. Contrast this permissive "may" with the mandatory "shall" for appeal
agents. On these advisors, see SSLR PRAcrIcE MANUAL § 46, at 1025-26, and
on its absence, when so proved in a criminal case, see note 193 infra.
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and to advise registrants on other matters relating to their
liabilities under the selective service law" (Pt. 1604.41). How-
ever, Part 1624.1 (b) specifically commands "[t]hat no registrant
may be represented before the local board by anyone acting as
attorney or legal counsel."'u '1
The initial classification proceeding and procedures as such
are not given. They may be inferred from the preceding, and
other rules and regulations: namely, after the registrant's file
is complete the local board (or assigned panel) meets, evaluates
the material, discusses, and votes, whereupon a classification
ensues. For example, I-A is given where the registrant "has
failed to establish to the satisfaction of the local board . .. that
he is eligible for classification in another class."135 All this is,
in theory, with nobody else present.139 As with judges, these
deliberations and determinations should not be influenced by
anything but the facts, under the policies of the Act and the
Regulations, and without pressures outside or inside their
chambers. However, the Regulations, as already noted, permit
the local board to require a government appeal agent to be
present at their "meetings". Since this general term includes
all assemblages of the board members for whatever purpose they
meet, the regulation is not limited grammatically to meetings at
which a classified registrant thereafter appears. Nevertheless,
it is only after such a classification occurs, and notice thereof is
mailed to him, that a registrant has thirty days after the mailing
of such classification to request an opportunity to appear in
person before the designated member(s) of the local board.
Although "in its discretion, [the board] may permit any person
137. Does this specific reference solely to "the local board," whereas else-
where the specifics include "appeal board" and "President," mean that a law-
yer may represent a registrant before these latter? See also note 2. Apparently
the question has never been raised or decided. Furthermore, whereas the
board's appeal agent aids, advises, and interprets on the laws and regulations,
the advisor is to aid registrants in the physical preparatory form work, and on
their "liabilities." What of the registrant's rights? And what of interpreta-
tions, etc. of the laws and regulations, and their applicability or inapplicability
to the particular registrant?
138. Pt. 1622.10. Does this place an undue burden on the registrant, and
therefore violate any constitutional right, and also create a presumption with-
out facts if these be not present (see, e.g., FoRKoscH, CONSTITUTIONAL Lx'W
§§ 422 and 424)? Apparently not, although quaere: by analogy to the pro-
posed Bail Reform Act presently in Congress, which seeks to use preventive
detention by, in effect, having an accused "show" he is not guilty, is not this
undue burden placed on the registrant unconstitutional?
139. Although, as just noted in the preceding paragraph, the local board
may "request" the appeal agent to attend its meetings. A registrar (see note
129 supra) or other volunteer or paid employee theoretically should not be
present Is there any Star Chamber tinge flavoring these proceedings?
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to appear before it with or on behalf of a registrant" (Pt. 1624.1),
as happens when the registrant is in a hospital, or outside the
country (see aZso Pt. 1655.11); in no event, however, may a
lawyer appear as such. At this "appearance" (the Regulations
nowhere refer to it as a "hearing" or by an analogous term)
[T]he registrant may discuss his classification, may
point out the class or classes in which he thinks he
should have been placed, and may direct attention to
any information in his file which he believes the local
board has overlooked or to which he believes it has not
given sufficient weight. The registrant may present
such further information as he believes will assist the
local board in determining his proper classification.
Such information shall be in writing or, if oral, shall
be summarized in writing by the registrant and, in
either event, shall be placed in the registrant's file. The
... local board ... may impose such limitations upon
the time which the registrant may have for his appear-
ance as they deem necessary.
140
The classification scheme emerging from these statutes and
regulations contains phrases and terms bearing upon the ques-
tion, what power is being exercised by the local board in classify-
ing a registrant, and what is the nature of this (or these) pro-
ceedings. Section 10(b) (3) of the Act, quoted above, states the
local boards shall "hear and determine" this, and other, questions,
and makes their "decisions . . .final" save where on "judicial
review . . . there is [found to be] no basis in fact for the classi-
fication . ... " It would be difficult to find another statute
more explicit and clear in what it purports to have the local
board do, what power it should exercise, and what the nature of
this particular proceeding is to be.1 4 1 No matter how this lan-
140. Pt. 1642.2(b). After this appearance the local board "shall consider the
new information which it receives and, if [it] determines that such new infor-
mation justifies a change" then a reopening and reclassifying occurs. Pt.
1624.2(c). The term "consider" appears in many instances on reopening,
reclassifying, etc. Pt. 1625.2, .3(a) and (b), .4, .11.
141. The 1940 statute's § 5(g), reenacted in 1948 as § 6 (1), contained a
provision that a local board's rejection of a claim of conscientious objection,
when appealed, was first to be referred by the appeal board to the Depart-
ment of Justice "for inquiry and hearing. The Department of Justice, after
appropriate inquiry, shall hold a hearing with respect to the character and
good faith of the objections of the person concerned, . . . [and] shall," after
such hearing, if the objections are found to be sustained, recommend one of
two items to the appeal board; if, "after such hearing the Department of
Justice finds that his objections are not sustained, it shall recommend" to the
appeal board accordingly. "The appeal board shall, in maling its decision, give
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guage is examined, "hear and determine" has ordinarily and
usually implied but one thing, where no qualifying language is
consideration to, but shall not be bound to follow, the recommendation. .. ."
The 1967 amendments, in § 1(7), re-cast § 6(j) so as to eliminate items,
including the above, and it is now found in 50 U.S.C. § 456(j).
In United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953), five members (Jackson not
participating) felt § 6(j) did not permit or require F.B.I. reports to the
Department of Justice (which "regularly used" it to investigate) to be made
available to the conscientious objector at such hearing so that he could "refute
-item by item, if necessary-the matters discussed in the investigator's report
[although see note 163 infra, concerning the right to a fair summary]. In sum,
respondents assimilate the 'hearing' in § 6(j) to a trial . . . ." (at 7). Frank-
furter (Black and Douglas joined) and Douglas (Black joined) filed dissent-
ing opinions. The first felt [about the three judges below (Swan, Learned
Hand, and Frank)], that "so strong a court and one so strong in literary
endowment... should rely... on the opinion of a District Judge impressively
attests the persuasiveness of that opinion" (at 10). That opinion referred to
"other provisions in the Act" which showed that the F.B.I. investigative report
was to "be made a part of the record for consideration by all directly con-
cerned with the classification" and, since the registrant had already put every-
thing in his file in the local board, "there would be no point to notify him to
appear in the departmental hearing just to put in more evidence" (at 11), evi-
dence which he did not have or, having, could use to seek re-classification at
the local level and then appeal. "Thus, by elimination, the only useful purpose
of notice at that stage was to give the registrant opportunity to meet the con-
tents of the report" (at 11). Frankfurter later said that "[t]he enemy is not
yet so near the gate that we should allow respect for traditions of fairness,
which has heretofore prevailed in this country, to be overborn by military
exigencies" (at 13).
Douglas's one-paragraph dissent stressed this misguided "use of statements
by informers who need not confront the person", and felt that these "faceless
people" should not be allowed to "escape the test and torture of cross-
examination" as otherwise "the person investigated or accused stands helpless"
(at 13-14).
It is suggested that: Nugent's statutory language is not what the present
Act's § 10(b) (3) covers and the fact-situations are therefore not the same,
despite the powerful arguments by the dissenters (only Black and Douglas
remain on the bench as of this writing). The majority did not and could not
factually hold against the characterization of the hearing as quasi-judicial or
against the right to counsel, as this was obiter. The majority merely held that
F.B.I. reports need not be so disclosed, and under other circumstances this,
too, has been upheld (next paragraph). Jackson's nonparticipation (he was a
former Solicitor General and then Attorney General before ascending to the
High Court) did not mean he would have agreed with Vinson's majority
opinion-the contrary would be more probable (see next paragraph). Today's
bench would be interested in the current actualities affecting the nation, which
has been discussed above, and the rights of a registrant in the light of these,
not past decisions based on different and inapplicable situations and principles.
Separately, in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd
4-4, 341 U.S. 918 (to reverse were Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson,
according to Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1950-51, 19 U. CHI.
L. Rav. 165, 197 (1952), an Executive Order provided for dismissal of a
governmental employee if "on all the evidence reasonable grounds exist for
the belief that the person involved is disloyal . . . ." The lower majority felt
that no constitutional field in this executive domain was involved, as the gov-
ernment was not required to retain employees in whom it lacked confidence,
and, further, its construction of the Order's language was that it did not
mandate a judicial-type hearing with confrontation, etc. The dissenter felt that
in this wholly nonsensitive position Miss Bailey's impugned loyalty was akin
to a finding of treason, loss of reputation and future jobs, and that this puni-
tive dismissal necessitated "all the safeguards of a judicial trial before it [the
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explicitly used, namely, an adjudicative, judicial-type, trial pro-
ceeding, whether in the courts or administrative agencies. 142
"1'Hearing' is a term of art in administrative proceedings.'14 3
While its single use'4 4 in a statute does not automatically necessi-
tate a judicial-type or trial hearing, a question of its meaning
and interpretation is first required to be answered within the
context of the conditions and situation surrounding its enactment.
However, in this legislation, the term is not unadorned. "De-
termine" is coupled with "hearing" by a conjunctive and it, too,
is a term of art, namely, to perform a judicial act.140 And when
the combined "hear and determine" is used the phrase can have
but one meaning in this context, and that is a judicial-type or
trial hearing.147 Thus, regardless of any constitutional require-
ment, this statutory admonition informs a local board that it
must follow this procedure before it can render "decisions".
This term also means something legal and judicial.148 Therefore,
by statute alone, and without the necessity of requesting judicial
aid on a constitutional basis, there should be no question of the
right to a trial hearing (or, at least, counsel) within the System
in classification proceedings. Of course there is qualifying lan-
guage elsewhere, as quoted above, such as that in Part 16.24.1 (b)
of the Regulations which rejects the use of an attorney, but
first, the statute itself contains no such limitations, and second,
punishment] is imposed." The Supreme Court thereafter rejected the proced-
ures and jurisdiction, rather than go into these questions again, so that Bailey
has been circumvented by a judicial end run (see FoRxoscH, CoNsTITUoNAL
LAW 181 n.49). Which in effect discloses once again the current views of the
High Court on these McCarthy-type decisions.
142. See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), where the statute re-
quired objections to proposed assessments to "be heard and determined by the
city council before" an ordinance could be enacted, and the court (2 dissents)
felt that now "due process of law" applied (at 385-6). Although Holmes, one
of the dissenters, a few years later commented that this was only because a
"relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally
affected, in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they had
a right to a hearing." Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 446
(1915). See also note 170 infra, and Grant v. Michaels, 94 Mont 452, 456,
23 P.2d 266, 270 (1933), and 39 CJ.S. Hear 875 n.15, 876 n.22(5), (1944)
and (Supp. 1968).
143. Feeney v. Willard, 129 F. Supp. 414, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
144. If qualified by "full," see note 118 supra, for the meaning usually
ascribed to it.
145. See FORICOSCH, ADNIsIsraSTATIVn 284-86.
146. See Gooch Milling & Elev. Co. v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 131, 137
(8th Cir. 1943); Tracy v. Maclntyre, 29 Cal. App. 2d 145, 84 P.2d 526, 528
(1938) ; Smith v. Board of Educ., 174 Ga. 735, 164 S.E. 41, 43 (1932).
147. See 26A C.J.S. Determine 888.
148. See Hankenson v. Board of Educ., 10 Ill. App. 2d 79, 134 N.E.2d 356,
363 (1956) ; Spahr v. Pennsylvania R.1., 141 Pa. Super. 24, 13 A.2d 919, 922
(1940).
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if the preceding analysis is correct, then this section of the
Regulations is ultra vires (and, pan passu, any "appearance"
limitation is likewise bad).
The nature of the proceeding is peculiarly judicial, as is
apparent from the local board's procedure in arriving at the
classification, the possible adversary procedure involved, and
the scope of review which is sharply limited. The procedure- has
the board examining the facts beginning with the registrant's
date of birth, checking and evaluating all information, determin-
ing the true facts, casting one against the other, finding what
seems to be the best answer to any conflicting evidence, and then
making their findings of fact and determination. 149 This present
determination which is based on findings of prior facts, "con-
stitutes the exercise of a judicial function. That function can be
exercised only after notice and an opportunity to be heard."150
Likewise, does the possibility of an adversary proceeding so
disclose the nature of the local board's procedures,151 and more
to the point, is the circumscribed judicial review permitted? The
statutory command is that the review is only on the question of a
149. In Dickinson v. United States, 203 F2d 336, 345 (9th Cir. 1953), rev'd
on other grounds, 346 U.S. 389 (1953), the court said "[w]e cannot subscribe
to any proposition that a draft board must give complete credence to all of the
claims of such a registrant. The board had the same right to evaluate the tes-
timony of a witness before it as has a trial court."
150. Gilchrist v. Bierring, 234 Iowa 899, 14 N.W2d 724, 732 (1944), a
license renewal case, and see FoRKoscH, ADmiNismrIV § 57.
151. See what Brandeis referred to in United States v. Abilene & Southern
R.R., note 125 supra, at 288-89. That was a proceeding before the I.C.C. on a
division of joint rates. Obviously one carrier would get less if the other
(assuming two) got more. From this point of view the Commission was act-
ig in the role of a court adjudicating between two adversaries, so that even
though "the proceeding was technically an investigation instituted by the Com-
mission" it still was subjected to the requirement that its finding be made on
evidence presented to and before it. "Every proceeding is adversary, in sub-
stance, if it may result in an order in favor of one carrier as against another."
Here, of course, one registrant is not opposed by another registrant to see
which is to receive a classification not desired, but in a larger picture there is
a degree of substance to this interpretation. But the concept of the silent gov-
ernmental interest, with the local board and the appeal agent now advocating
it, and both opposed to the individual before them, clearly discloses one aspect
of the adversary nature of the proceeding. Another such adversary aspect is
disclosed where the local board acts punitively, in defiance of the statutes, and in
its "basically lawless" conduct reclassifies because of a registrant's delinquency.
In the district court it was held this "does not constitute penal action," Oes-
tereich v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 11, 280 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D.C. Wyo.
1968), and ajfd in 390 F2d 100 (10th Cir. 1968), but the Supreme Court
reversed, note 133 supra. At the very least, and disregarding all else, the indi-
vidual should have his own counsel present to analyze, argue, and present on
his behalf, and otherwise factually and legally support his position. As later
urged, no great harm to or delay in the board's processes occurs because of
this.
152. See the Estep case, note 7 supra at 122, and FoPaoscH, Asmns-
T rAvn § 760.
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"basis in fact for the classification," and this means an exceed-
ingly restricted scope of review for the courts." 153 However, in
practice, the Supreme Court has utilized the normal and usual
substantial evidence rule in its review, although mouthing
adherence to the basis in fact standard.'5 The lower courts have
also mentioned different terms while likewise utilizing the
broader approach. 55
What and how does this "basis in fact" review differ from
the statutorily required substantial evidence rule? Since this
review is statutorily provided it is to be approached from the
necessity, and not the actuality, of the situation. In the 1951
UniversaZ Camera58 case Frankfurter traced the evolution of the
standard for, or scope of review of, quasi-judicial agency de-
terminations and showed that because of an ambiguity "by
imperceptible steps" the "belief justifiably arose" that any evi-
dence, even "when viewed in isolation, substantiated the Board's
findings." This was decided to be error, in that the standard
required the "substantial evidence" to be based on the whole
record (i.e., any disagreement as to the findings of fact between
the trial examiner and the agency is to be included). This degree
of proof must be found to exist by the reviewing court before
the decision could become final. "The substantiality of evidence
must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight."1 57 The "basis in fact" is on the other hand
analogous to the "any evidence even 'when viewed in isolation'"
approach that was rejected in UniversaZ Camera. If a judicial-
type proceeding involves and requires a judicial-type hearing
then ordinarily the scope of review is the broader substantial
evidence rule. Only where an exception is permitted is a nar-
rower scope to be upheld, and it is suggested that, absent a
national and grave emergency of significant proportions and
153. Blalock v. United States, 247 F2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957). See also
United States v. Bornemann, 298 F. Supp. 1253 (D.C. Conn. 1969).
154. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953), similarly paying lip
service to basis in fact while again actually utilizing the substantial evidence
approach in Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, (1955).
155. See Capehart v. United States, 237 F2d 388 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied 352 U.S. 971 (1957) ("substantial evidence" term used) ; United States
v. Phillips, 143 F. Supp. 496 (N.D.W.Va. 1956), affd 239 F.2d 148 (4th Cir.
1956) ("reasonable basis in fact"); Rempel v. United States, 220 F2d 949
(10th Cir. 1955) ("rational basis in fact"), collated in DAvis, ADm-NISTRA-
TwE, note 67 supra IV, 151.
1g6. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), on which see
FoRKoscn, ADMINIsTRAMva § 257, and also Has the "Whole Record" Formula
Superseded the "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 3 LAB. LJ. 455, 519 (1952).
157. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, at 478, 485 and 487
(1951).
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immediate applicability, it is unconstitutional to substitute the
very narrow basis in fact scope of review for the broader
substantial evidence one. Further, today the courts should
review the alleged emergency situation and reverse the Estep
decision on this point and denounce any statutory restriction
in this respect.
This conclusion is farther bolstered by what Brandeis urged
in a deportation, e.g., (overseas [combat] assignment?) proceed-
ing: that the order there "deprives [one] of liberty . . . . It
may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that
makes life worth living." The court, therefore, granted a
do novo review, even though a. judicial-type immigration hearing
had been conducted. And in 1920 the High Court granted a like
broad de novo review when property (in a rate-making proceed-
ing, where the contention was that a deprivation of a reasonable
return would thereby result in a confiscation of property) was
allegedly taken without substantive power. This decision has not
been reversed despite strong opposition by great judges,159 and
has had the effect of dignifying property above human rights
where no emergency was claimed or existed.
The Regulations, given in some brief detail above, together
with the classification scheme which emerged, additionally sup-
port the overall conclusion just reached that a judicial-type
hearing is contemplated, involved, and occurs before such class-
ification. When authorized, and properly drafted and promul-
gated, these regulations ordinarily have the force of law and
bind persons as well as the agency itself,160 so that a violation of
its procedures which prejudices the individual will invalidate
the board's actions or determinations.16 Ordinarily the "key"
to classification is the questionnaire, which contains numerous
158. Ng Fung Ho v. White, note 123 supra, at 284.
159. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, note 79 supra with
Brandeis (Holmes and Clarke) dissenting, followed in the St. Joseph Stock
Yards case note 117 supra, with Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo dissenting,
although raising procedural requirements before granting a de novo review,
and limiting the review to the record facts so that any claimed new evidence
would require a remand to the agency for consideration. See New York v.
United States, note 102 mipra, at 334.
160. See Service v. Dulles, note 133 siupra, at 372, citing United States ex
rel. Accardi v. Shaugnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). See also note 128 supra.
See further N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1969, at 32, col. 2, that local boards are
being attacked for violating Pt. 1604.52(c) in that their members are not truly
local in composition; and Walsh v. Local Board, 305 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), holding "blatantly lawless" the board's refusal to grant student defer-
ment in that situation.
161. See Wills v. United States, 384 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1967), and on the
burden see United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1967).
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details to be supplied 82 by the registrant. However, the local
board has a variety of powers to investigate (e.g., the subpoena
power), request, and otherwise obtain whatever additional
material it requires, including amplification by or through the
registrant himself. 6 8
Thereafter at least a quorum of the local board must meet
and act as a board, in conformity with the regulations, (other-
wise it acts at leas ultra vires),'" and a classification is made
in camera. This action necessarily includes a sifting and eval-
uation of the evidentiary facts 0 5 so that upon the resulting basic
facts the local board will find the individual to be within a
certain group and thereupon classify him as such. This will be
the extent of their determination, though not necessarily final.'6"
This procedure, analogous to what occurs in a court trial or
administrative quasi-judicial type hearing, is required by lan-
guage in the regulations: that the board (or panel) "decide"
or "determine" the classification; that any testimony must be
sworn to (and the prescribed oath is identical to that adminis-
tered in courts); that the appeal agent must "interpret" the
162. What is the effect of deliberately false answers, so that a registrant
obtains an incorrect classification and deferment? See United States v. Bat-
taglia, 410 F2d 279 (7th Cir. 1969), upholding conviction, cert. denied, 90
S. Ct. 73 (1970). If compulsory self-incrimination is claimed, regardless of the
falsity of the answers, see United States v. Knox, 90 S. Ct 363 (1969), a
wagering registration tax case, rejecting this contention. May Knox now
analogously be used to reject the registrant's contention because even though
he could have validly refused to complete the form, the information was
nevertheless voluntarily given by him. See also Bryson v. United States, 90
S. Ct. 355 (1969), decided simultaneously with Knox, and also FoRxoscH,
CONSTiTUTIrNAL LAW, 288 n.18, as well as Minor v. United States, 90 S. Ct.
284 (1969). See also note 128 supra.
163. If the board members go outside the written information in the file
then not only are the regulations breached but a basic violation of fairness
occurs, for the individual cannot know that "evidence" he must combat, e.g.,
United States v. Simmons, 348 U.S. 397 (1955), requiring a summary of the
F.B.I. report under former § 6(j) of the Act (see note 141 supra). However,
Pt. 1623.1 (b) requires the classification "be determined solely on the basis of
the" written information in the file (see also note 132 stpra) so that an ultra
vires act, at the least, occurs.
164. One court has dignified such a violation as being of procedural due
process, United States v. Walsh, 279 F. Supp. 115, 121 (D.C. Mass. 1968),
but this is not so; the reason is that the resulting classification is not yet
"permanent" (see note 166 in!ra) and the individual may seek a hearing, as
next described. If no quorum is present the classification is void, and telephone
calls are not enough (Walsh, supra).
165. E.g., the supervising registrar may "note .. . which [answers] he
believes to be incorrect or false" when the individual registers originally, note
129 supra and while not applicable here, is this not what the board members
do, and also in evaluating?
166. "No classification is permanent," Pt. 1625.1(a), but for purposes of
appeal the one given here, if no hearing is sought, is permanent till changed;
similarly with all classifications.
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laws, etc., for the members who are to be unbiased and uninflu-
enced by aught except the record facts. If the initially-classified
registrant requests an "appearance" before the board within
thirty days after the mailing of the classification, he may
"discuss", i.e., give additional testimony and his interpretation
of the facts, and present arguments and "point out" overlooked
facts and his correct classification. During this discussion the
government appeal agent may assist the board in protecting the
government's interests, whereupon the board "considers" all the
evidence and "determines" whether or not a re-classification is
to occur. This initial or preliminary determination together
with the subsequently required one, is a judicial-type proceeding,
and the resultant classification involves the taking of a consti-
tutionally-protected right.
The constitutional field here involved, plus the exercise
of a quasi-judicial power where a statute and/or regulation
mandates a hearing ("appearance"), must and ordinarily does
require minimum procedures conforming to due process at least,
before the second, or final, classification or determination of
the board. The full panoply of these constitutional minimums
are demanded in the regulatory agencies and other agencies
pertaining to property; at the very least, in theory, they should
be applied where liberty and life are at stake. But a full-scale
judicial-type hearing in the classification process must yield
somewhat to the realities of the conscripting reason and purpose.
The extreme of a deliberative full hearing cannot therefore be
utilized just as its coin-face extreme, no adequate safeguards,
must yield. In Part II the suggestion of a gray mean is made.
B. National Emergency Needed to Take Away Right to Counsel
In the opening paragraph of this subdivision II we ventured
that two main objections could be made to the System's denial
of the right to counsel in its classification procedures. The first
of which has been answered, namely, the registrant's right to a
full and fair hearing prior to the classification. The second
objection was that even where exceptions are permitted these
constitutional rights (at least to counsel) cannot be taken except
and unless the conditions are so grave that national survival is
at stake. Some of these exceptions indicate the type of emergency
which justify the temporary postponement of the judicial-type
hearing in the agency.
167
167. See note 115 supra.
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For example, a statute and regulations permit the agency to
appoint a conservator for a federal savings and loan association
on grounds that its affairs were being conducted in an unfit
and unsafe manner injurious to and jeopardizing the interests
of its members, creditors, and the public. Such a conservator was
appointed and took possession of an association, which sought the
return of its property alleging a violation of due process as no
notice or hearing had been given it beforehand, even though the
regulations provided for an agency hearing afterwards; a three-
judge district court agreed. The Supreme Court reversed, even
though "[t]his is a drastic procedure. But the delicate nature of
the institution and the impossibility of preserving credit during
an investigation ... [requires] this summary manner. It is a
heavy responsibility to be exercised with disinterestedness and
restraint .... ,1108
So, too, in an unfit-food summary destruction situation, where
the Court queried, "[W]hat is the emergency which would
render a hearing unnecessary" before the agency so acted?
"Food that is in such a condition, if kept for sale or in danger
of being sold, is in itself a nuisance, and a nuisance of the most
dangerous kind, involving, as it does, the health, if not the lives,
of persons who may eat it .... If a party cannot get his
hearing in advance of the seizure and destruction he has the
right to have it afterward ... in an action brought for the
destruction of his property . ... .,19 A concern for the interests
and welfare of the public was the keystone here, and it neces-
sarily must also be that a like concern for the immediate safety
of the nation is at the basis for any like postponement of the
right to a hearing before classification. There are two aspects
of this argument which create doubt as to the analogy-first,
is there really a postponement, and second, how is the immediate
safety of the nation being aided by the alleged postponement?
In the bank and food cases there were, respectively, a full and
complete agency and court trial afterwards. This is true in
every constitutional field, e.g., in a tax assessment where
more than a relatively few persons are concerned who are not
exceptionally affected on individual grounds. 70 The theory
is that due process does not demand a trial hearing at the initial
168. Fahey v. Mallonee, note 115 supra, at 253-54.
169. North American v. Chicago, note 115 supra, at 320, 315-16, respectively.
170. Bi-Metallic Investment v. Colorado, supra note 142, referring to Lon-
doner v. Denver. After the assessment the individual may object according to
the proper procedures and receive a full hearing in the agency or in a court.
[Vol. 2
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stage or at any particular "point in an administrative proceeding
so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final order
becomes effective." 171 So long as an agency judicial-type hear-
ing, or a trial in a court, is held prior to the determination
becoming irrevocably final,17 2 then procedural due process in a
constitutional field is served. But here the postponement of any
hearing from the initial (Star Chamber, if no later hearing
occurs?) classification until after the "appearance" does not, in
this situation, result in a judicial-type hearing, nor does it
occur in an appeal board or before the President. The basic
reason for postponing the quasi-judicial determination to a
period after the agency's decision or order stems from the
emergency and needs of the situation. Quaere: assuming the
factual existence of a sufficiently grave national emergency in
the 1940's, does this permit that conclusion of a legal emergency
to continue ad infinitum? Or, with peace treaties (regardless
of the German situation) and the termination of the war, does
the legal conclusion and then-emergency give way to later and
present conditions? In the light of current events, e.g., that for
January 1970 the draft call is reduced from the 85,000-man
quota originally assigned in November 1969 to only 12,500 men;
that training companies have been reduced from 560 to 460 as
of December 1, 1969, thereby eliminating thirty advanced train-
ing companies; and that three basic training centers out of a
total of sixteen are to be closed by the spring of 1970,113 can it
seriously be urged that a sufficiently grave emergency today
exists so as to justify any reduction in one's constitutional rights
to a trial hearing at some place, agency or court, before arms
are placed in one's hands? Or that the scope of review should be
kept as narrow as discussed above? And even if the government
171. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, note 115 supra and the other cases
cited with it
172. See FoRxoscn, ADmimsTRATIVE §§ 254, 299, 306.
.173. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1969, at 1, col 6, giving Defense Secretary
Laird's announcement, and stating the Administration proposed to reduce the
armed forces by 220,000 men. On November 25th the President announced the
scrapping of germ weapons. And on November 26th the President signed into
law a bill permitting a Selective Service lottery but said he would not be
satisfied until a "completely volunteer" army, navy, and air force resulted, and
this "is our ultimate goal."
This goal raises other questions, e.g., does today's impersonal war so change
and brutalize our conscripted fighting men that a form of dehumanization may
occur permitting the Songmy (Mylai Hamlet No. 4) massacre of March 16,
1968, to occur, to be explained, to be excused, and thus to become a tactic? If
so, does a volunteer corps become inured to this and permitted so to do be-
cause it is only one small segment of our nation, which therefore does not
affect the national psychology, interests, morals, and values? Or are we
affected and infected nevertheless?
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continues to urge retention of factually outmoded fictions or
presumptions of emergency conditions by raising bogeymen,
still, in the end, how can it justify the denial of counsel in the
classification "appearance"?
On this last aspect there is one contention which has not yet
been suggested, namely, the consequences attendant upon any
judicial reversal of the legislative-administrative-judicial coop-
eration of the past. Now the government may urge that if the
registrant becomes constitutionally entitled to a judicial-type
trial hearing in the classification process, or if the judicial scope
of review is broadened beyond that granted by the statute, the
political and other consequences for America's position vis-d-v&
the world, and the ultimate effects upon our national interests,
are grave, incalculable, and so portentous that the Supreme
Court must shrink from assuming this responsibility. First, what
are the consequences in terms of fact, not theory or horrendous
possibilities? Has any study been made illustrating factually
the number of registrants who have requested their "appearance"
rights? And what this number is compared to the total number
classified, or within the classifications initially made, i.e., on
percentage or absolute bases? Or do we know how many so
requesting have then demanded a full hearing? Or, aside from
such demand, how, many have demanded only their right to
counsel? Second, do we know exactly what would happen to
the overall draft proceedings if all of the preceding could be
estimated and their impact separately or in conjunction eval-
uated? Third, what of the right to counsel without the other
rights, and its impact within the system when considered alone-
would the presence of counsel so materially hamper and affect
the local board's processes that grave harm would result? Where
are the facts, if any, to support this claim ?
1 7 4
These questions are not rhetorical. They are posed to show
that today we are proceeding on a basis of theory and speculation,
and playing blindman's buff17 5 with the hearing rights, counsel
rights, and other rights of the citizens of this nation. Regardless,
the judiciary can certainly take judicial notice of the lack of any
continuing or present national emergency, of the imponderables
174. See Frankfurter's comment in note 51 supra. Congress may, through
one of its committees, easily obtain these statistics; even the President, to
whom has been delegated control of the System, can call for these facts; and,
finally, the Director has them within his reach.
175. Clark's term in Simmons, note 163 supra, at 405, stating, "The Con-
gress, in providing for a hearing [under § 6(j)] did not intend for it to be
conducted on the level of a game of blindman's buff."
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and values within our national background and upon which the
nation was conceived (Part I supra), and proceed accordingly.
In this regard the very least that is indicated by the facts and
the background here developed is that counsel at "appearances"
is a constitutional and statutory right; that no great harm will
result if it now is required judicially, and that human rights
are thereby considered at least on a par with property.
Finally, and even if any harm to the national interest does
result, the great individual values involved require, at the least,
that the Court look at the picture through spectacles which
balance out its myopia. These weight the received image with
the physical impairment so that decent vision results. Here the
balancing formula, though sometimes rejected, is more often
used: "Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar gov-
ernmental interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a
balancing by the courts of competing private and public interests
at stake in the particular circumstances shown. 1 "07 On balance,
and under the present-day facts, do not the advantages to our
citizens and the great national interests to be furthered by
giving at least this degree of counsel due process to registrants
outweigh any inconvenience to local boards resulting therefrom?
If it be urged that there is insufficient manpower, a simple
remedy is available-increase the size of the boards, enable more
panels to sit, and thereby distribute any increased work among
these members."'" Or, if it be felt that without the constitutional
right to counsel being effectuated within the System the entire
classification process must fall, the Supreme Court has already
176. Harlan, in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959),
although Black then stated "I do not agree" to such a "congressional or
judicial balancing process" in this area of First Amendment freedoms, at 141,
with Warren and Douglas agreeing with Black. See also Warren's views in
United States v. Robel, note 37 supra, at 268 n.20. Cf. however, Black's
earlier (balancing) language and views in Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943). For other language supporting the balancing ap-
proach see Frankfurter's concurring remarks (Harlan) in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266-67 (1957), and see FoRKoscH, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 421-23, discussing the balancing formula and giving additional cases and
quotations. On the use of such a conception political situations, see article by
Smith, Germ War: What Nixon Gave Up, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1969, at 16,
col. 6, stating the President "gave up a few horrible and probably unusable
weapons in the American arsenal to gain possible advantages of security for
the nation and prestige for himself."
177. As they are uncompensated volunteer workers, there is no added finan-
cial burden, while the little additional space or other requirements are slight
inconveniences when compared with the gains to be derived. Arguelndo, the
induction occurs sans the right to counsel, can not every inductee now obtain
a writ of habeas corpus, and with a lawyer, seek redress in the courts? Which
entails the greater burden, permitting counsel before or after induction?
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said that it would strain the words of. a statute "in the candid
service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt." 78
(. The Need for Counsel
Assuming that at the very least the right to counsel should
be recognized, one may ask why this is so important. Or, put
differently, why should this take precedence over the other
rights found, e.g., in the Bill of Rights?'" 9 The second question
need not be answered, although in Part III a solution is pro-
posed. The first question is answered in several respects by the
Regulations and by the decisions of the Supreme Court. The
former recognize that the System's labrinthine procedures hold
pitfalls, and so permit an "advisor" to be appointed "to advise
and assist registrants in the preparation of questionnaires ...
and to advise registrants on other matters relating to their
liabilities under the selective service law.""*° A lawyer can thus
perform a variety and multitude of services before, during, and
after the registration, and before, during, and after the classifi-
cation.' 8 ' He is trained to read and hopefully to make sense
out of statutes and regulations and to understand administrative
language and questionnaires.18 2 The lawyer can raise objections,
unknown to or unseen by the layman-registrant: board action
contrary to the Regulations,' 8" a delegation by the local board
to its clerk to act as its agent in an "appearance" situation,1 4
any classification action by less than a majority of a quorum
present in person, 8 5 a failure to reclassify after the registrant's
appearance before the board,186 the use by the board of infor-
mation concerning registrant and his family not in the file, 8 7
the board's refusal to consider new information, 8 8 a decision by
the local board of delinquency (punishment) because of pro-
178. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953), per Frankfurter.
179. On the pros and cons of a preferred Bill of Rights (external and in-
ternal) position, see FoRyoscur, CoNSTiTu~iON.AL LAW 428-31.
180. See text following note 136 supra.
181. See the suggestions in SSLR PRAcTicE MANUAL § 1006 at 1031 which,
though few, indicate somewhat the lawyer's job.
182. See Storey v. United States, 370 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1966).
183. United States v. Peebles, 220 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1955); Niznik v.
United States 173 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925. See
also Knox v. United States 200 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1952).
184. United States v. Peterson, 53 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
185. Application of Shapiro, 392 F.2d 397 (3d Cir. 1968).
186. United States v. Gillis, 122 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
187. United States v. Bender, 206 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1953).
188. United States v. Zieber, 161 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1947).
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testing the Vietnam involvement,'8 9 and the board's handling of
prima facie conscientious objector claims differently.190
There are some cases which state that even though an advisor
is not appointed, or is not available, or their names and ad-
dresses are not listed, no legal injury results' 91 unless there
is an affirmative showing by the registrant of resulting prej-
udice.192 A more refined view has, however, at least been
expressed by the First Circuit. 93  Does the former approach
apply to the lack of counsel, that is, must a registrant ordinarily
first show prejudice before this right attaches, or should at-
tach?19 4 While it has been held that a classification proceeding
is not a criminal one, as ordinarily it does not impose punish-
ment,195 still liberty, and possibly life, are affected, as well as
property, e.g., the economic consequences such as loss of a
business run by the registrant, or of a job and advancement, or
of schooling and betterment in and for the future. The words
189. Wolff v. Selective Service Board No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967),
and see next paragraph's quacre.
190. Miller v. United States, 388 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967).
191. What is prejudice? And when is it sufficiently minor or egregious to
be ignored or condemned? See Simmons v. United States, note 163 supra, at
404, where the Court said that "the notice ... does not, in our view, convey
clearly to the layman the idea that he must make a request for the resume
prior to the hearing or forever waive his rights in this respect." In Frank v.
United States, 236 F2d (9th Cir. 1956) the board's refusal to reopen a classi-
fication was upheld where the registrant's letter asked for a "personal appear-
ance" and not a reopening on a claim of conscientious objector. Cf. however,
Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956), holding that oral
notice to the chairman of a change in status is to be treated as a request for
reopening (per the present Mr. Justice Stewart).
192. See United States v. Jones, 384 F. 2d 781 (7th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Capson, 347 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911
(1965); Pate v. United States, 243 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1957) Clark v. United
States, 236 F2d 13 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956).
193. Steele v. United States, 240 F2d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 1956), a 2-1 deci-
sion, where the objector was convicted of failing to report. The court felt
there was no constitutional requirement "that a registrant be provided with
free advice and assistance" although, by regulation (which had the force of a
statute), it might be accorded. A failure to supply an advisor therefore was
not a constitutional violation. Ordinarily the registrant would have to couple
this board failure with prejudice to him, but now, in a criminal case, where
a defendant shows this lack of advisor, then the prosecution has the burden
of proving "that the denial of the procedural safeguard has not prejudiced the
defendant" (at 146).
194. If a criminal case were involved, then Steele would conflict with
the others, note 192 supra, where tvo had certiorari denied, although now, in
place of an advisor, we discuss lack of counsel.
195. See United States v. Cralle, 415 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Brooks, 298 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. La. 1969), "Proceedings before
draft boards are not stages in a criminal prosecution, thereby entitling a regis-
trant to all of the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution. See
also Storey, note 182 supra, and note 191, but cf. note 133, where the abuse
of this classification power is denounced, and note 151 sutpra.
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adopted by six Justices in Gideon are sufficient to dispel such
a requirement of prejudice, and show that without more, the
lack of a lawyer injures a registrant:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, gen-
erally, of determining for himself whether the indict-
ment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules
of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be
put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to
the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.
196
III. WHAT RIGHTS ACCOMAPANY Tim RIGHT TO COUnSF?
If a constitutional right to a hearing in the classification
process is sustained or, at the least, the right to counsel, does
1
196. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963), quoting Suther-
land in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-9 (1932). Douglas concurred but
opened, "While I join in the opinion of the Court, a brief historical resume
on one point (note 199 infra) seems pertinent" (at 345). See also, A. LEws,
GmEoN's TRumPET 223-38 (1964), who shows the aftermath's (i.e., the new
trial's) victory for Gideon disclosed the extreme value of the attorney's pres-
ence and services. On the right to counsel, etc., in children's court hearings
see It re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and in disbarment, In re Buffalo, 390 U.S.
544 (1968). In Vaccarino v. United States, 305 F. Supp. 732, 735-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), release was granted to an inductee illegally denied a re-
classification hearing, the court pointing to the "mind-numbing maze of
statutes, regulations and memoranda" of the System, and saying: "In view of
that policy [of denying counsel, and the informality of the proceedings] and
the labyrinth of statutes and regulations, which are inscrutable not only to
laymen but also to most lawyers, the board cannot hold registrants to a
precise use of technical terminology."
It may be noted that the sixth amendment right to counsel in criminal cases
has been continually expanded. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); and applied elsewhere, as in income tax state-
ments, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), to give but these few
illustrations. More importantly, this right to counsel furnishes the jurispru-
dential basis for use in fourth and fifth Amendment situations, which (see
FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL § 426), is applied retroactively even though in the
other amendment's areas retroactively may not be so applied. Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), and see Fo~aoscH, supra, § 427.
[Vol. 22.
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this latter require that any other rights can piggy-back their
way into the "appearance"? And if so, what are these other
rights? Regardless, what consequences would now flow if the
appearance (trial hearing) is so broadened? It is suggested that
no answer can or should be given to these questions at this
moment. The empiric and "gradual process of judicial inclusion
and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall re-
quire, 197 should control. For the classification appearance, just
as with due process of law, "is not a mechanical instrument. It
is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of
adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by
those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the
process." i °8 Thus the use of a meat-axe instead of a scalpel is
unjustified, where a procedural innovation comes into play
without prior experience under it. Permitting the full range
and panoply of constitutional rights, the entire Bill of Rights to
enter the classification proceeding, would probably overload the
System, cause a breakdown, and create more problems than the
one it seeks now to solve. This is a horrendous probability, not
possibility, and its logical extensions need not be further ex-
plored.
Separately, is the entire range of procedural rights under due
process of law to be invoked within the System, e.g., in the class-
ification proceeding? It has been suggested that the rationale of
the System cannot permit this, but that a gray mean be utilized
between this extreme and that of the present. This suggested
compromise permits all present methods and procedures to be
utilized but requires the registrant to be accorded the right of
confrontation whenever and wherever possible, with his counsel
then being able to cross-examine (within the usual limits im-
posed in judicial or quasi-judicial trials). This right would
remove the stigma of Star Chamber from the local boards, and
permit a degree of confidence in the process to be restored. But
such a procedure requires a broadening of the judicial review
"basis in fact", and while not necessarily to the extreme of
"substantial evidence on the whole record" presently applying to
the regulatory agencies, perhaps to an "arbitrary or capricous"
in-between. This might well be left to the courts which, as has
been noted, mouth "basis" while somewhat applying "substan-
197. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1878).
198. Frankfurter, concurring in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951). See also his concurrence in Louisiana
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
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tial". As for the method of judicial review, the courts have
already made an inroad and modified the strictness of the
habeas corpus-after induction procedure and, again, may like-
wise have the opportunity left to them to go further into this.
These conclusions do not require that only the right to counsel
be recognized, because in this area, after an experimental opening
period, other questions may arise. For example, is Gideon to
apply, so that while any registrant financially able to do so
should have the right to retain counsel of his own choosing,
an indigent one should be provided with a lawyer without
charge? Or is this too much financially and procedurally for
the System to bear?199 First, although the Regulations today
reject the use of counsel by a registrant before the local board,
another provision authorizes volunteer "advisors" to assist reg-
istrants for all other purposes, and they may easily be increased
and now permitted so to appear, as well as being lawyers.
Second, there are numerous groups and organizations which
provide counsel in criminal and civil matters, so that an exten-
sion of their services to encompass a classification proceeding
could be simply effectuated.200 Third, all this assumes a large
number of registrants would seek counsel, and also seek counsel
without charge, and this is not known statistically. Regardless,
the right to counsel would be watered down if not provided for
the poor.
Is there any other penumbral or peripheral procedural aspect
which piggy-backs into the classification proceeding with the
right to counsel? The Mirand620 1 warnings ordinarily have no
applicability in the usual administrative proceeding, especially
within the Selective Service System, 202 and throughout the
199. To illustrate the thought involved, in Gideon, note 196 sutpra, Harlan's
concurrence felt that by holding this sixth amendment fundamental right to be
one embraced by the fourteenth amendment, the Court did not "automatically
carry over an entire body of federal law and apply it in full sweep to the
states," at 352. To which Douglas, also concurring, replied that the former's
view, shared by the late Justice Jackson, was that a Bill of Rights guarantee
applied to the states was now "a lesser version of the same guarantee as
applied to the Federal Government.... But that view has not prevailed and
[such absorbed] rights . . . are not watered-down versions. . . ." at 347.
Regardless of the cost aspect, numerous O.E.O. and other legal service pro-
grams have been attacked because the government is paying lawyers to counsel
litigants who now sue the government In the present aspect, however, this
argument is inapplicable and senseless.
200. See SSLR PRACTICE MANUAL § 1005 at 1030-31 for discussion and
references to constitutionality of group legal services to the registrant.
201. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), and see FoRicoscir, CONSTITUTONAL § 425, and esp. §§ 424-
27, 29.
202. Note 195 mipra.
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REGISTRANT'S RIGHT TO CounsEL
registration-classification procedure the individual's rights to
sufficient time and aid in properly preparing his file is indi-
cated (aid is, as has been shown illusory, and the advisor a
facade). The right to be heard personally (and now through
counsel) in one's behalf is in the Regulations, the power of
subpoena is held by the board and may be exercised, 203 no classi-
fication is permanent and so reopenings on new evidence occur
with new classifications and new appearances, and there is a
right to appeal within the System, conceivably up to the Presi-
dent.
It appears to this writer, at this moment, and under the
eclectic method suggested, that a fair procedure can be had as
above suggested where counsel becomes a. right, so that more
than the preceding need not be urged. In time, and with
experience, a re-evaluation may occur and new procedures
drafted.2 0 4 No fundamental, basic, essential, or other constitu-
tional or constitutionally protected rights need therefore be
urged at the present moment. But without the right at least
to counsel, the classification proceeding today, under present
circumstances, is a snare and a delusion, a farce committed upon
an unsuspecting public, and a violation of one's most important
of constitutional rights in this situation.
20 5
203. There are no cases on this point, that is, a rejection of a registrant's
request for a subpoena (duces tecum) so as to have testimony adduced which
he claims will aid in resolving his classification, when judicial review later
occurs.
204. See as occurred in dropping the Department of justice hearing, note
141 su pra.
205. " I cannot accept the view that anywhere in our system resides or lurks
a power so unrestrained to deal with any human being through any process of
trial ... Nor has any human being heretofore been held to be wholly beyond
elementary procedural protection by the Fifth Amendment. I cannot consent to
even implied departure from that great absolute." Rutledge (Murphy), dis-
senting in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 81 (1946).
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